




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Konferenz der Kantonalen Justiz- und Polizeidirektorinnen und -direktoren
Conférence des directrices et directeurs des départements cantonaux de justice et police
Conferenza delle direttrici e dei direttori dei dipartimenti cantonali di giustizia e polizia

Swiss Confederation

Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP
State Secretariat for Migration SEM



Third Integrated Border Management Strategy (IBM Strategy III)

November 2023

Adopted by the expanded Border Steering Group on 22 November 2023 for consideration by the Federal Council and CCJPD
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List of abbreviations

ACM	Association of Cantonal Migration Offices
ALO	Airline Liaison Officer
API	Advance Passenger Information
BBl	Federal Gazette (Bundesblatt)
BE	Canton of Bern
BMVI	Border Management and Visa Instrument
CCC	Common Core Curriculum for Border and Coast Guards (Frontex)
CCJPD	Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors
CCPCS	Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders of Switzerland
CD	Consular Directorate (FDFA)
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CSPP	Conference of Swiss Public Prosecutors
Cst	Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (FNA 101)
CustA	Customs Act (FNA 631.0)
DDPS	Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
EES	Entry-Exit System
EGVO	Ordinance on Entry and the Granting of Visas (FNA 142.204)
ETIAS	European Travel Information and Authorisation System
EU	European Union
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FADO	False and Authentic Documents Online
FDF	Federal Department of Finance
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDJP	Federal Department of Justice and Police
fedpol	Federal Office of Police (FDJP)
FIS	Federal Intelligence Service (DDPS)
FNIA	Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNA 142.20)
FOCBS	Federal Office for Customs and Border Security (FDF)
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GE	Canton of Geneva
GL	Canton of Glarus
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IBMF	Integrated Border Management Fund
ILO	Immigration Liaison Officer
IRMA	Integrated Return Management Application
ISP	Integral Situational Picture at the External Borders
NCC	National Coordination Centre EUROSUR (FOCBS)
NCPT	National Commission for the Prevention of Torture
NFPoC	National Frontex Point of Contact (FOCBS)
NHRI	National Human Rights Institution
NTC	Network Training Centre (FOCBS)
NW	Canton of Nidwalden
OPCAT	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
PA	Police Attaché
PCMA	Federal Act on Police Counterterrorism Measures
PNR	Passenger Name Record
RECAMAS	Return Case Management System
SEM	State Secretariat for Migration (FDJP)
SIS	Schengen Information System
SO	Canton of Solothurn
SR	Classified Compilation of Federal Legislation (Systematische Rechtssammlung)
VIS	European Visa Information System
ViZG	Ordinance on International Border Security Cooperation (FNA 631.062)
VS	Canton of Wallis
ZH	Canton of Zurich

1 Introduction

The aim of Integrated Border Management (IBM) is to manage the Schengen external borders effectively, efficiently and systematically in order to make them more secure through better controls while keeping them as open as possible to legal travellers. IBM covers all operations for controlling the crossing of external borders, including addressing potential threats to these borders and combating illegal migration and crossborder crime. Since Switzerland is surrounded by Schengen states, it is not possible to leave or enter the country to or from a non-Schengen state by land. Switzerland's external Schengen borders are therefore located at airports and airfields designated specifically for this purpose.

This strategy is the third national IBM strategy (IBM Strategy III). It has been developed by the relevant stakeholders (see Chapter 3) and taken note of by the CCJPD and the Federal Council. It is based on the multi-year policy cycle for European integrated border management and covers the years 2024–29.

IBM Strategy III seeks to implement Switzerland's vision of integrated border management (see Chapter 4) with strategic objectives (see Chapter 7) and relevant measures (presented in a separate Action Plan) in line with applicable standards and legal requirements (see Chapter 2).

2 Standards and legal requirements

IBM Strategy III is based on national, European and international standards and legal requirements. The standards for integrated border management at European level are defined by the European Union and the members of the European Border and Coast Guard in the following documents:

- Schengen Borders Code²
- 2018 Schengen Evaluation
- Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896)³
- European Commission: Thematic evaluation of December 2020 of the national IBM Strategy II
- European Commission: Strategy for a European integrated border management of 14 March 2023⁴
- European Border and Coast Guard: Technical and Operational Strategy for European Integrated Border Management 2023–2027⁵ of 20 September 2023.

Switzerland is represented in the Frontex 'European Integrated Border Management' working group, which deliberate over the technical and operational strategy for integrated border management.

Border management in Switzerland is governed by the following national legislation:

- Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (Cst)⁶
- Foreign Nationals and Integration Act (FNIA)⁷
- Ordinance on Entry and the Granting of Visas (EGVO)⁸
- Customs Act (CustA)⁹
- Ordinance on International Border Security Cooperation (ViZG)¹⁰
- Cantonal police legislation.

1 Art. 8 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.

2 [Regulation \(EU\) 2016/399](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).

3 [Regulation \(EU\) 2019/1896](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624.

4 [COM/2023/146](#): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council establishing the multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management of 14 March 2023.

5 [Management Board Decision 30/2023](#) adopting the Technical and Operational Strategy for European Integrated Border Management 2023-2027 of 20 September 2023.

6 [Federal Constitution \(SR 101\)](#).

7 [Foreign Nationals and Integration Act \(SR 142.20\)](#).

8 [Ordinance on Entry and the Issuance of Visas \(SR 142.204\)](#) (French, German, Italian).

9 [Customs Act \(SR 631.0\)](#) (French, German, Italian).

10 [Ordinance on International Border Security Cooperation \(SR 631.062\)](#) (French, German, Italian).

3 IBM stakeholders and tasks

Switzerland views border management as an overall system involving numerous stakeholders that include federal and cantonal authorities, the member states of the Schengen area as well as EU agencies, in particular Frontex.

Under Switzerland's federal system, the tasks of border control are divided between the cantons and the federal authorities (FOCBS). The cantons are responsible for conducting enforcing returns. Eight Swiss border control authorities operate at Switzerland's external Schengen borders.¹¹

The (expanded) Border Steering Group is the federal and cantonal authorities' strategic exchange platform and the central coordination body for integrated border management. All the relevant stakeholders are represented in this body.

Border Steering Group

The Border Steering Group is a strategic consultative body and the main coordination body for matters of border management. It serves the federal and cantonal authorities as an exchange platform. The expanded Border Steering Group monitors the implementation of IBM strategic goals and measures, and is the highest oversight and approval organ with regard to the Action Plan. It thus functions as the central management structure required by the European Commission, coordinating border management and return measures by all the authorities involved.

The expanded Border Steering Group is chaired by SEM and is made up of the following bodies: FOCBS, fedpol, CD, FIS and SEM (federal bodies); the cantonal police forces of Bern, Geneva, Ticino and Zurich, and the CCJPD, CCPCS, ACM and CSPP (cantonal bodies). The Border Steering Group has approved the latest IBM strategy, which will now be submitted to the Federal Council and the CCJPD (political level).

The table below lists the IBM stakeholders (in alphabetical order) and describes their tasks.

Entity	Core tasks
ACM	The ACM brings together the federal and cantonal migration authorities and supports the cantons in enforcing federal immigration and asylum law.
Cantonal police forces of BE, GE, GL, NW, SO, VS, ZH	The cantonal police forces of Bern, Geneva (in cooperation with the FOCBS), Glarus, Nidwalden, Solothurn, Valais (in cooperation with the FOCBS) and Zurich carry out border controls at the airports and airfields on their respective territory.
Cantons	The cantons are responsible for immigration- and security-related border controls as well as for controlling the boarder outside the defined border crossing points. Some cantons have delegated border controls at airports on their territory to the FOCBS.
CCJPD	The CCJPD coordinates police, judicial, law enforcement and migration cooperation at the political level between the cantons and with the federal authorities. Along with the Federal Council, the CCJPD takes note of the IBM strategy and can issue mandates to implement important measures.
CCPCS	The CCPCS fosters cooperation and the exchange of expertise and experience between the different Swiss police forces. It coordinates the operational implementation of policy objectives in key police matters.
CD	The CD acts as a single point of contact, providing efficient and customer-friendly consular services worldwide. It cooperates with federal offices, cantonal bodies, foreign authorities and other national and international partners. It also supports Swiss consulates and embassies in visa matters and plays a coordinating role in matters relating to Swiss nationals who live abroad.
CSPP	The CSPP promotes cooperation between the cantonal and federal prosecution authorities. Its purpose is to facilitate the exchange of views between the cantonal and federal law enforcement services and to coordinate common interests.

¹¹ Police forces of the cantons of Bern, Geneva, Glarus, Nidwalden, Solothurn, Valais, Zurich and the Federal Office for Customs and Border Security (FOCBS) insofar as cantons have delegated the control task to the FOCBS.

Entity	Core tasks
Federal Council	The Federal Council, along with the CCJPD, takes note of the IBM strategy and can issue man-dates to implement important measures.
fedpol	fedpol detects and combats organised, national and cross-border crime related to illegal migration. It coordinates intercantonal and international investigations on serious crime and the exchange of information between foreign and national partners. fedpol also develops strategies and implements measures to prevent serious crime. For example, it coordinates at strategic level the analysis of and fight against human trafficking and people smuggling between national and cantonal authorities and civil society, and provides its partners with information on conducting identity checks and on how to combat the misuse of identity documents.
FIS	The FIS analyses the security aspects and impact of migration, particularly with respect to terrorism, violent extremism and espionage.
FOCBS	Under the Customs Act, the FOCBS is responsible for controlling the movement of persons and goods across customs borders. It also carries out border controls at individual airports on behalf of some cantons based on an administrative agreement (Art. 97 CustA in place of Art. 9 FNIA).
SEM	SEM is responsible for all matters relating to immigration and asylum law in Switzerland. It is responsible for the conceptualisation of border control measures and ensuring compliance with these measures, and issues border control directives for the operational authorities. It is also responsible for the return of persons whose asylum application has been rejected or who are staying in Switzerland illegally.

Table 1: IBM stakeholders and tasks

4 Vision

Switzerland's integrated border management strategy is based on the following vision:

Switzerland operates a professional, legally compliant and efficient border management system

- which enhances the security of Switzerland and the Schengen area as well as international security;
- which allows the smooth entry and departure of legal travellers and thus preserves the country's appeal as a destination;
- which combats illegal migration and cross-border crime;
- which respects and protects fundamental rights;
- which seeks the effective return of people not authorised to stay in Switzerland;
- which uses modern technology appropriately;
- which works collaboratively with the relevant stakeholders in Switzerland and abroad.

5 IBM framework

The four-filter model commonly used in the context of European border management¹² is based on the assumption that the successful and efficient fight against illegal migration does not begin at the external borders of the Schengen area, but already in third countries¹³ (filter 1) and includes cooperation with neighbouring third countries (filter 2), controls at external borders and risk analyses (filter 3), and measures within the Schengen area as well as return (filter 4). The 15 components¹⁴ can relate to one or more filters. The four-filter model shows to what filter the components belong, but is not a content-related framework for the IBM strategy. Chapter 7 describes components a)–o) and their related strategic objectives.




Figure 1: IBM framework

12 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, recital 11.

13 In the Schengen context, the term 'third countries' refers to all states that are neither EU members nor Schengen-associated states.

14 Art. 3 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.

6 Trends

Based on the annual risk analysis by Frontex¹⁵, the Federal Council 2021 Security Policy Report¹⁶ and the 2022 Supplementary Report¹⁷, as well as the assessments of IBM stakeholders in Switzerland, trends have been identified that could influence IBM developments and activities, and lead to opportunities as well as challenges in the coming years. Chapter 7 outlines how integrated border management in Switzerland intends to address these trends.

Mobility and migration

The pressure to migrate to Europe remains high as a consequence of numerous unresolved armed conflicts, increasing climate- and environment-related challenges, a growing number of fragile states and the widening discrepancy between Europe and other parts of the world in terms of prosperity, security and future prospects. The war in Ukraine and the subsequent migration of Ukrainian refugees to Switzerland and other countries in the Schengen area are just one example of this.

In addition, passenger volume, driven by prosperity, low air fares and increasing mobility in general, is expected to rise.

Public and internal security

Geopolitical instability and the rise in the number of conflict zones are fuelling the spread of extremist ideas and radicalisation. Thanks to the availability of information and communication technologies as well as social media, extremist groups can share and spread their ideologies with relative ease. They also use migration movements to enter Europe and recruit new members, posing a threat to public and internal security.

Low-risk, high-profit business models and increasing links between criminal groups are making cross-border crime more diverse and complex. The COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to new business models and channels for criminal networks, which use modern technologies to develop novel and sophisticated *modi operandi*. Efforts by the EU and its member states to prevent this kind of cross-border crime are hampered by the deteriorating security situation at the EU's eastern external borders.

Hybrid threats

Hybrid threats are actions by state and non-state actors aimed at exploiting the legal and operational vulnerabilities of border management to ultimately undermine security. Examples of such actions include cyberattacks on border infrastructure or the use of propaganda and disinformation (for example, about visa and migration policy) to control migration movements with the aim of destabilising either an individual country or the Schengen area in general.

Governance and digitalisation

The tasks of integrated border management are becoming increasingly complex and the pace of Schengen reform remains consistently high. The subsequent growing demands on governance and the already insufficient financial and human resources pose major challenges.

Increasing digitalisation and connectivity are leading to technical dependencies between systems with major implications for data management. However, interoperability between systems has the advantage that comprehensive and accurate databases can be used for border management.

Due to these interdependencies, sudden or unexpected events including technical malfunction, natural disasters, pandemics and armed conflict are likely to increase in frequency and have an impact on the reliability of infrastructure. Such events will place high demands on border management governance and operations in the future.

15 Frontex [Risk Analysis](#) for 2022/2023.

16 Federal Council Security Policy Report of 24 November 2021 ([BBl 2021 2895](#)) (German, French, Italian).

17 2021 Supplementary Report to the Security Policy Report on the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Report by the Federal Council ([BBl 2022 2357](#)) (German, French, Italian).

7 Components

The European Commission's strategy for an integrated European border management and the technical and operational border management strategy of the European Border and Coast Guard, which is based on the European Commission's strategy, provide the framework for the activities of the border management authorities of the Schengen area and for Switzerland's IBM strategy. The IBM strategy III also takes into account the results and recommendations of the 2018 Schengen evaluation and the 2020 thematic evaluation of the previous IBM strategy.

The European Commission's strategy defines policy priorities and strategic guidelines for each component. These form the basis of its technical and operational strategy, which is broken down into goals, success measures and process steps. The goals are described in detail and listed as actions in the technical and operational strategy's action plan.

The European Commission's two strategies and their annexes provide the framework for Switzerland's IBM Strategy III, its 13 components and their objectives. Switzerland seeks to achieve these objectives within the implementation period of IBM Strategy III through a series of measures, which are listed in a separate action plan.

Under the IBM Strategy II, the FDJP and the CCPJD launched the reFRONT project to explore potential for improving cooperation between the federal and cantonal authorities. The project, consisting of four subprojects – (1) Training; (2) Processes, infrastructure and technology; (3) Risk analysis; (4) Policy and governance – resulted in a comprehensive final report with recommendations. The project and results were discussed in 2023 by the relevant political authorities, the CCJPD and the Federal Council, who have instructed the appropriate authorities to further develop the recommendations during the IBM Strategy III's implementation period.

a) Border control



With the high pressure of migration, the increasing complexity of cross-border crime and the demands on governance and digitalisation, the challenges of border management are increasing. These challenges are compounded by state and non-state actors who are expected to continue exploiting legal and operational loopholes in order to pursue their illegal cross-border activities. To ensure effective and secure border control in the future, these challenges must be met using the latest technologies and through close cooperation between national stakeholders and with European partners and third countries.

Border controls at Schengen's external borders (in Switzerland at airports and airfields) serve to prevent illegal entry into Switzerland and thus into the Schengen area. Switzerland contributes to the internal security of the EU through various instruments aimed at preventing and detecting terrorism and cross-border crime such as people smuggling and human trafficking.¹⁸ By preventing terrorists or criminals from entering or leaving the country, Switzerland is helping to strengthen not only its own security, but the security of the entire Schengen area.

Border management according to the vision of this strategy (see Chapter 4) requires the necessary legislative, organisational, technical and personnel resources and capacities. Operational planning and response capability require accurate risk analyses and up-to-date situational pictures, among other things.

Border management also requires suitable systems and technologies. The EU's new as well as upgraded information systems serve to increase the security of the Schengen area by making border controls more efficient and effective through digital processes and resource-saving procedures. Switzerland has implemented the Schengen-relevant EU information systems (e.g. API, PNR, VIS and, in future, ETIAS, EES and a new screening regulation). The physical and technical infrastructure required for the further development of the systems must be in place and functional in Switzerland by the time they go live (see Chapter 7j). At present, further development of the systems remains challenging due to their increasing complexity, the number of different processes and the volume of data that must be synchronised in real time. This needs to be improved over the next few years.

In order to become more interoperable, cost-efficient and sustainable, border management must make use of technological advances (e.g. artificial intelligence). Border control authorities must have innovative solutions that comply with legal provisions to assist them with their tasks (see Chapter 7o).

¹⁸ Counterterrorism Strategy for Switzerland of 18 September 2015 ([BBl 2015 7487](#)), Federal Act on Police Counter-terrorism Measures (PCTA) of 25 September 2020 ([BBl 2020 7741](#)), 2023-2027 [National Action Plan](#) to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.


When performing their tasks, the Swiss border control authorities uphold and respect fundamental and human rights. In this regard, further efforts must be made to identify vulnerable persons and victims of crime such as migrant smuggling and human trafficking, since identifying victims also helps to identify the perpetrators of crime. Switzerland's national action plan against human trafficking¹⁹ (see Chapter 7m) is one instrument for combating this form of crime.

The exchange of information and data at European and national level is vital for border control authorities to be able to act effectively. Switzerland supports and has implemented information systems and initiatives that facilitate this exchange, such as the False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) database. Risk analyses and a national up-to-date situational picture, including migration flows, trends, modi operandi and document forgeries, provide the border control authorities with important information. A great deal of information, from European (Frontex), national and cantonal sources, is already available; this information should be prepared for the border control authorities in an aggregated and concentrated form, including a differentiation between national and air borders (see Chapter 7c). All border control authorities should have access to the information and share their findings. Data sharing (e.g. on entry refusals at airports) must be further improved. With a common infrastructure and uniform systems and processes, exchanging such information should become faster and easier. Plans to this effect were approved in principle during the reFRONT project under the previous IBM strategy. The Federal Council and the CCJPD have instructed the authorities to expand on these plans.

Strategic objectives

- a1/c3: Make national risk analyses products (including up-to-date situational pictures) available to the authorities concerned promptly and directly.
- a2: Improve access to information and further promote the exchange of data between border control authorities for efficient border management.
- a3/j2: Define and procure border management infrastructure and system requirements jointly or in a coordinated manner.
- a4/n2: Ensure that border control, police and migration authorities have staff who are trained in using new technologies and systems, allowing them to make effective use of database search options within the regulatory framework.
- a5/n3: Foster experience-sharing between national authorities as well as with partner authorities abroad in order to acquire knowledge and expertise.
- a6: Ensure that the border control authorities have at their disposal a technical and physical infrastructure adapted to the volume of passengers and to the new systems, which enables efficient and legally compliant border control.

b) Search and rescue operations at sea



As a landlocked country, Switzerland does not maintain a maritime search and rescue service. Accordingly, this strategic component is of no practical relevance to the Swiss strategy.

c) Risk analysis



Managing and controlling migration, preventing illegal migration and combating evermore complex crossborder crime is becoming increasingly challenging. Responding to these challenges effectively requires an in-depth understanding of the risk and threat situation. For this reason, national and European risk analyses must be further improved, better coordinated and more efficiently organised.

In Switzerland, various authorities at national and cantonal level have considerable knowledge on illegal migration. However, this knowledge and the insights gained from it have been only inadequately coordinated and centralised up to now.

Risk analyses, such as integral situational pictures, information bulletins and vulnerability assessments, must be geared towards the needs of the cantons and national partners and made directly available to them. They must also be standardised and take current European standards into account. It is essential that situational pictures are up to date and information on the latest developments (for example, on new modi operandi) is exchanged promptly between authorities so that they can identify and respond to sudden

¹⁹ [National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking 2023–2027](#) of 18 December 2022, strategic goals 2.2 and 3.3.

or rapid developments. Risk analyses should cover all levels of the four-filter model (see Chapter 5), including customised and integral situation pictures on external as well as internal borders. Where necessary and appropriate, analyses should also be compiled for specific phenomena.

Risk analyses should be compiled centrally and coordinated with the individual border management authorities. All border management authorities should provide key information and data regularly, systematically and in compliance with uniform standards. This objective was approved in principle as part of the previous IBM strategy in the reFRONT project, and the Federal Council and the CCJPD have instructed the authorities to expand on it. Information and data from the Frontex risk analysis (see Chapter 7d), from partner authorities abroad and from other sources such as ILOs and ALOs (see Chapter 7g) must also be taken into account and integrated into the analyses.

Strategic objectives

- c1: Establish a formal national risk analysis structure that involves all the relevant stakeholders, with defined tasks and responsibilities.
- c2: Compile national risk analyses products based on the needs of stakeholders and in line with current European standards. The federal and cantonal authorities contribute their resources, data and findings to preparing these analyses.
- a1/c3: Make national risk analyses products (including up-to-date situational pictures) available to the authorities concerned promptly and directly.

d) Information exchange and cooperation with member states and Frontex



The consistently high frequency of Schengen reform, continuing high migratory pressure and the growing complexity of data management mean that cooperation within the framework of European Border and Coast Guard is becoming increasingly challenging. Switzerland has a major interest in protecting its external borders effectively and therefore in cooperation with European Border and Coast Guard.

The Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard²⁰ regulates the ongoing development of Frontex and provides a framework for the increasing exchange of information via secure information systems such as the EUROSUR network. The growing legal and technical requirements for information exchange between the Schengen states and Frontex necessitate close cooperation and coordination between the stakeholders. Despite strict requirements, stakeholders must be able to exchange information, for example risk analyses (see Chapter 7c) and other sensitive information, quickly and efficiently in order to counter threats such as cross-border crime, terrorism and illegal migration effectively. To this end, Frontex and the Schengen states employ and are improving various instruments, including joint situational pictures, accredited communication networks such as the EUROSUR network, and the relevant technical infrastructure.

Switzerland exchanges information with Frontex on the current situation, trends and potential threats at the external borders through various points of contact located at the FOCBS, for example the National Coordination Centre for EUROSUR (NCC), the National Frontex Point of Contact (NFPoC) and the Network Training Centre (NTC), among others. These national coordination mechanisms (for example for weekly situation reports, interdepartmental working groups and for gathering data for vulnerability assessments) foster efficient cooperation between the partners.

An effective integrated European border management requires good technical and operational planning between the Schengen states and Frontex. Under the provisions of the Regulation, all Frontex member states must allocate more personnel for joint operations at Schengen's external borders in the future. Switzerland contributes to the protection of Schengen's external borders through its participation in these Frontex operations; they are an important component of the third filter (see Chapter 5) and ensure the internal security of the Schengen area and Switzerland. Active participation in Frontex operations is expedient both from a tactical-operational perspective and in terms of the principle of shared responsibility: Switzerland's personnel commitment to Frontex operations thus contributes to the collective capacity of the agency.

Border protection officers must undergo initial and ongoing training in line with Frontex requirements (see Chapter 7n). Representatives of all the Swiss authorities involved will continue to participate in the various strategic, operational and tactical Frontex meetings in the future and raise any concerns they have.

Strategic objectives

- d1: Contribute in quantitative and qualitative terms to the resources required by Frontex, while taking into account Switzerland's own requirements.

20 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.

- d2: Provide the technical and human resources necessary for the timely exchange of information, in compliance with legal regulations.
- d3: Provide the necessary resources for conducting vulnerability assessments and remedy any vulnerabilities at Switzerland's external borders.

e) Cooperation between national authorities



In order to combat today's wide range and cross-border nature of crime, close cooperation between Switzerland's national authorities is essential for managing the increasing complexity and overlapping of tasks, the interdependencies of systems and ongoing digitalisation.

Reliable cooperation structures are essential for effective cooperation. Key elements of good cooperation between the border management authorities include an institutionalised and timely exchange of information, joint risk analyses (see Chapter 7c), the use of European and national instruments and capacities²¹, and uniform standards and training (see Chapter 7n). In addition, cooperation with law enforcement services must be strengthened in order to combat cross-border crime (see Chapter 7h for cooperation between the police and the FOCBS).

When seeking to foster effective cooperation between national authorities, Switzerland's federal structure of governance and the corresponding division of powers between federal government and the cantons must be respected. However, existing structures such as the Border Steering Group can be strengthened and cooperation made more binding. A point to be considered is whether the Border Steering Group should be given funding as a financial incentive for improving border management. These objectives were approved in principle as part of the previous IBM strategy in the reFRONT project, and the Federal Council and the CCJPD have instructed the authorities to expand on them. In addition to strengthening policy and governance (enhanced harmonisation), cooperation should be institutionalised and harmonised also in subsidiary areas such as training (see Chapters 7n and 7m), processes, infrastructure and technology, and risk analysis (see Chapter 7c).

In addition, the legal groundwork in particular must be better coordinated in future (for example, in the Border Steering Group). This central coordination mechanism will ensure a harmonisation of the various authorities' border management activities.

Strategic objectives

- e1: Strengthen cooperation between the border management authorities and law enforcement services in order to combat cross-border crime.
- e2: Have a body of federal and cantonal representatives with the authority and budget to define and monitor binding operational standards and joint processes for coordinating border management.
- e3: Centrally coordinate training, risk analyses, processes, infrastructure and technology.

f) Cooperation between EU organs, institutions and other bodies



In the European Commission's strategy, this component refers in particular to cooperation between Frontex and other European actors. It is therefore of little practical significance to Switzerland. Other aspects of European cooperation are described in the 'Components' section of this document.

g) Cooperation with third countries



Globalisation and increasing mobility create new challenges that require ever closer cooperation with third countries. Conflicts, scarce resources and political instability in many countries are triggering migration movements. The pressure to migrate to transit regions and to Europe persists, and migration continues to be instrumentalised to political ends. Preventing illegal migration and cross-border crime effectively does not begin at Schengen's external borders, but earlier, in third countries. It is important that Switzerland and the Schengen member states work collaboratively with third countries, for example on visa matters, the secondment of personnel abroad and international migration cooperation, to facilitate legal travel while ensuring the readmission of illegal migrants to their countries of origin.

21 Legal, organisational, technical and personnel capacities.

Switzerland advocates a statutory framework for visas that facilitates legal travel but does not encourage illegal migration or compromise national security. It is therefore actively involved in the discussions on implementing and developing the Schengen acquis on visas. In order to achieve the goals of its migration policy, Switzerland also utilises new instruments under Visa Code, such as the possibility of imposing visa measures against third countries that do not cooperate on readmission.

In order to facilitate the application procedure, the Schengen states aim to be represented in all third countries whose nationals require a visa. Switzerland is therefore examining various forms of cooperation with external service providers and the Schengen member states. In the visa procedure, Switzerland takes into account security aspects under the Schengen provisions and other national security considerations.

The secondment of airline liaison officers (ALOs), police attachés (Pas) and immigration liaison officers (ILOs) serves to prevent illegal migration and cross-border crime in countries of origin and transit. The deployment of these officers depends on the country and the circumstances. Their task is to establish rapid and direct contact with the local authorities in order to exchange information and foster cooperation. In addition, they analyse developments on the ground, which contributes to risk analysis (see Chapter 7c), and cooperate with the Schengen states and third countries in areas related to integrated border management such as preventing illegal entry, fostering police cooperation and combating human trafficking. They also help to influence migration in the countries of origin through specific measures, such as training partner authorities.

Switzerland pursues a coherent foreign policy. To this end, it makes use of synergies between migration policy, foreign policy and international cooperation. It proactively addresses migration issues by establishing close cooperation with the countries of origin and transit through migration dialogues, agreements and partnerships. In addition, it supports projects in the areas of return assistance, reintegration, illegal migration and human trafficking prevention, refugee protection and capacity building. Switzerland is also committed to vocational training and access to employment so that young people have job opportunities at local level, the lack of which is one of the causes of illegal migration. It also addresses areas such as judicial and police cooperation, which contributes to better migration management.

In addition to bilateral cooperation with third countries, further instruments of Swiss migration policy include multilateral and regional platforms and processes such as the Rabat, Khartoum and Budapest Processes. Switzerland is committed to common principles and objectives in the area of migration that conform with international law, such as the principle of non-refoulement. At European level, Switzerland is committed to a coherent European migration policy and participates in joint European action within the framework of its Schengen association.

Strategic objectives

- g1: Promote a statutory framework for visas at European level that facilitates legal travel but prevents illegal migration and threats to national security. Utilise scope for action with regard to visa procedures in order to achieve Switzerland's migration policy objectives.
- g2: Regularly assess the deployment of liaison officers (ALOs, PAs, FOCBS attachés and ILOs) according to priorities and the situation on the ground in order to foster close cooperation with third country authorities and the international liaison network.
- g3: Conduct migration dialogues with the main countries of origin and transit, and seek to formalise cooperation through agreements or partnerships in order to improve migration management.
- g4: Strengthen strategic and operational cooperation with third countries in the areas of readmission and human trafficking/illegal migration prevention, thereby making a contribution to European integrated border management.

h) Controls within the Schengen area (incl. internal border controls)



The persistently high level of migration to Europe and subsequent secondary migration within the Schengen area, the increasing complexity of cross-border crime and the exploitation of legal and operational vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors will continue to have a personnel and technical impact in the coming years. This applies not only to controls within the Schengen area, but also to those at internal borders if reintroduced.

A comprehensive situational picture and risk analysis are essential for effective controls within the Schengen area under the Schengen Borders Code (see Chapter 7c) and serve as a basis for targeted measures (e.g. checks on travellers who use certain transport companies) and for police- and customs-related checks. A comprehensive situational picture and risk analysis are also important for operational planning and for the effective deployment of human and financial resources in the event that internal border controls are reintroduced. They facilitate effective police controls to combat illegal migration and ensure these controls are carried out in the right place. At present, sophisticated and timely risk analyses and

situational pictures on current phenomena, particularly with respect to secondary migration, are lacking both at European and national level. The Integral Situational Picture (ISP) provides up-to-date monthly data on illegal migration at Switzerland's external borders (3rd filter) and gives an overview of the situation within the country (4th filter), including figures on persons apprehended by the FOCBS who are travelling illegally inside the country. Switzerland seeks to expand and develop this instrument further (see Chapter 7c).

In order to use the available resources efficiently and in a targeted manner for police controls to combat illegal migration inside the Schengen area, future capacity planning must be based on advanced information systems such as the API, EES, ETIAS, SIS and VIS (see Chapter 7a and 7j), and on better risk analyses and situational pictures. These instruments, including the ISP and EUROSUR, must be improved and used more extensively. In addition, existing police cooperation agreements should be utilised to improve cooperation with neighbouring countries, for example through joint risk analyses and operations. The exchange of information at national level between the border control authorities and other actors operating at the external and internal borders should be fostered (see Chapter 7e).


There should be continuity and interoperability between controls at the external borders and technical and operational measures within the Schengen area in order to prevent illegal migration and crime at both the external and internal borders. The police should carry out checks on persons within the legal framework of the Schengen Borders Code, while the FOCBS should have a visible presence at customs controls at Switzerland's borders and within the country. If necessary, the cantons can delegate police-related security tasks to the FOCBS on the basis of administrative agreements with the FDF (Art. 97 CustA).

The authorities involved (police, customs, FOCBS) should acquire the skills and knowledge required for carrying out controls inside the Schengen area through training and hands-on experience as well as through consistent use of the available information systems (see Chapter 7n).

Strategic objectives

- h1: Use external border control instruments (EU information systems) combined with technical and operational measures in the internal border area to help detect and prevent unauthorised secondary movements, illegal migration and cross-border crime.
- h2: Use police- and customs-related instruments to increase security within the internal border area.
- h3: Improve the knowledge and skills of the authorities (police, customs, FOCBS) for carrying out controls within the internal borders through specific training.
- h4: Promote risk-based planning in order to deploy personnel and technical resources more effectively (improve capacities).

i) Return



The persistently high pressure of migration towards Europe and the instrumentalisation of migration by some countries of origin or third countries for political purposes are just two of the trends that underline the future importance of a well-functioning system for returning persons obliged to leave Switzerland and the Schengen area.

Return is a key element of a credible migration policy. People who are not eligible to stay in the Schengen area including Switzerland must leave. Switzerland therefore pursues a consistent return policy. First and foremost it encourages people to depart voluntarily, but if necessary it also enforces

legally binding removal decisions using coercive police measures. Switzerland is one of the most effective countries in Europe when it comes to enforcing Dublin transfers and removals to the country of origin. Important elements of Swiss return policy include seeking alternatives to administrative detention and implementing measures to reduce the risk of absconding. Switzerland respects the fundamental rights of returnees and the principle of non-refoulement (see Chapter 7m) in its return procedures.

Switzerland promotes voluntary return supported with return assistance. Asylum seekers are provided at an early stage in the asylum procedure with comprehensive information about return assistance programmes. Return counselling and voluntary departure with return assistance are a priority and are accessible at every stage of the asylum procedure. Return assistance is also discussed in the migration dialogues and often leads to greater acceptance by the authorities in the countries of origin. Frontex's mandate has been expanded to include the European return and reintegration programme, in which Switzerland also participates.

Switzerland has concluded cooperation agreements on return and migration partnerships with various countries. With some countries, operational cooperation works well without an agreement. There are, however, a number of countries with which cooperation on return is difficult, for example because they do not accept forced returns. In most cases where cooperation is difficult, other European countries face the same challenges with the same countries. The Federal Council considers better cooperation with these countries a priority and is taking the necessary measures to achieve this. Switzerland is also working collaboratively with its European partners to improve cooperation with certain countries of origin (see Chapter 7g).

In addition to using and developing existing national return policy instruments, Switzerland is increasingly using European instruments. Frontex not only supports member states through coordinating and financing return operations, it also conducts its own operations. The agency helps with procuring travel documents while member states provide specialist personnel to support other member states and Frontex with their tasks. Frontex's extended mandate also includes support for voluntary return by means of reintegration assistance. Switzerland follows these developments and makes use of certain Frontex services, particularly if they lead to cost savings and improve operations. Switzerland also utilises synergies between Frontex and national planning instruments for return. The IBM Strategy III, for example, is also Switzerland's national strategy document on return, while the Action Plan also serves as an operational return strategy.²² In addition, Switzerland uses the IRMA application and is developing a national return management system along the lines of the Frontex RECAMAS reference model.

The operational strategy for more effective returns and the corresponding policy document²³ of the European Commission of 2023 are further important instruments of return policy. Switzerland liaises with the EU return coordinator in the High-Level Network on Returns, collaborates on European initiatives and supports measures in European bodies (Council of the EU, EU Commission, Frontex) that not only contribute to improving the effectiveness of return, but also go beyond national responsibilities and require cooperation between the Schengen states and with countries of origin. In addition, Switzerland is committed to improving return data and statistics, which is important for the comparative data of the European states and for developing return instruments and measures.

Strategic objectives

- i1: Strengthening the role of Frontex in providing member states with operational support in all phases of the return process.
- i2: Use Frontex services in specific areas of the return process.
- i3: Promote and increasingly use European programmes for voluntary return and reintegration.
- i4: To enable more proactive planning, Switzerland is working at European level to improve data collection and comparability as well as analyses on return, reintegration and readmission. This will be combined with the further development of its digital return management system.

j) Use of state-of-the art technology



The growing sophistication of criminals' *modi operandi* makes the targeted and efficient use of modern technologies essential for border management. The increasing complexity and interoperability of border management systems pose both a challenge and an opportunity: while border control is more reliable as a result of comprehensive and accurate databases, interconnectivity means that border control processes are increasingly dependent on the availability and integrity of technological systems. This means that modern technologies are becoming more and more vulnerable to system failures and cyber attacks.

Border controls must be carried out in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code. This requires the consistent application and further development of the EU's migration, border management and security information systems. It also requires that the interoperability between these systems and Switzerland's national systems be optimised (see Chapter 7a). Switzerland will ensure that new and existing systems, including their further development, are implemented promptly and in accordance with the legal provisions.

To support border controls, Switzerland seeks to use advanced, interoperable and resource-efficient technical systems and solutions that are compatible with EU information systems. This will ensure efficient and reliable border management in the future. The border control authorities are already using some automated solutions, such as eGates at airports. However, in order to enhance the security of the population, facilitate border controls and the legal crossing of external borders, and combat cross-border crime and terrorism in a more targeted manner, the potential of technical solutions must be exploited further and the interoperability of border- and security-related information systems improved. While innovative solutions and artificial intelligence can be useful for controls (see Chapter 7o), the rights of citizens and third-country nationals (e.g. in matters of data protection and fundamental

²² Art. 9 para. 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.

²³ [Policy document](#) towards an operational strategy for more effective returns adopted by the Commission on 24 January 2023.

rights) must be respected at all times. New solutions should be developed through pilot projects and dialogue with partner authorities abroad.

Uniform processes, infrastructures and technologies are required throughout the country in order to boost efficiency. IBM Strategy III seeks to provide a framework in which the development of processes and border management systems are coordinated, and system, procurement and infrastructure requirements are jointly formulated. This includes the central organisation and joint operation of the systems and infrastructure required for controlling the Schengen external border. These objectives were approved in principle as part of the previous IBM strategy in the reFRONT project, and the Federal Council and the CCJPD have instructed the authorities to expand on them.

Guaranteeing the security of the systems must comply with federal and cantonal provisions. Cyber security objectives and measures have been defined in the National Cyber Strategy (NCS).²⁴

Strategic objectives

- j1: External border control staff work with uniform systems and processes. All authorities (police, customs, FOCBS) carry out immigration law-related checks on persons in Switzerland in accordance with Schengen standards and uniform processes
- a3/j2: Define and procure border management infrastructure and system requirements jointly or in a coordinated manner.
- j3: Explore and promote new advanced, interoperable technical systems and solutions for increasing the efficiency of border management and conserving resources.

k) Quality control mechanisms



Quality controls (including audits, reviews and vulnerability assessments) and other appropriate control mechanisms will become increasingly important in view of the continuing high pressure of migration, ever-increasing passenger volumes, the growing demands on governance and ongoing digitalisation and interconnectivity. Quality controls must ensure that integrated border management is implemented effectively and in accordance with applicable law and recognised best practices. They are also an important instrument for preparing for sudden situations such as infrastructure failure (for example, in the form of an emergency plan).

The function of the existing quality control mechanism (see Chapter 7a 'Border control' by means of mutual audits of the border control authorities at Switzerland's external borders and airports) is to review national and international legal provisions and their implementation. The findings and recommendations of the audits are submitted to the authorities involved, and the Border Steering Group (in its supervisory function, see Chapters 2 and 7e) is informed accordingly.

A national quality control mechanism covering all components and involving all participating authorities is being developed at present. The new mechanism will review the effectiveness, legal conformity and resilience of integrated border management implementation and identify areas for improvement. The implementation of a national quality control mechanism is a high priority: the findings from this new mechanism will be important for developing and planning national border management in the future and will be taken into account when prioritising the use of EU funding instruments and national programmes.

In addition to this national mechanism, the European quality control mechanism (Schengen evaluations and Frontex vulnerability assessments) is also an important instrument for examining how effective the implementation of integrated border management is in Switzerland. Switzerland provides the data for the Frontex vulnerability assessments in good time and actively participates in the Schengen evaluations. In future, Switzerland may have to provide even more experts for certain areas of the Schengen evaluations. Their expertise and any synergies should be utilised to benefit Switzerland's national quality control mechanism.

Strategic objectives

- k1: Switzerland has a suitable quality control mechanism that covers all integrated border management components.
- k2: National-level planning and priorities are based on the results of Swiss and of European control mechanisms. The findings from applying these mechanisms are taken into account when using EU funding instruments.
- k3: The federal and cantonal authorities provide the necessary number of qualified experts for each area of the Schengen evaluations.

²⁴ [National Cyberstrategy](#) of 13 April 2023.

l) Solidarity mechanisms



The EU has established a fund to support and promote selected projects. As a Schengen-associated state, Switzerland contributes to this fund, whose aim is to provide solidarity-based support to those Schengen states that bear high costs for protecting the Schengen external borders due to their extensive sea or land borders or major international airports. This solidarity mechanism is an important response to increasing governance requirements, advancing digitalisation, persistently high migration pressure, increasing mobility and hybrid threats.

The Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument (BMVI) is part of the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), set up for the period 2021-2027. BMVI supports the effective integrated European protection of Schengen external borders, guaranteeing internal security while maintaining the free movement of persons within the Schengen area.

The use of BMVI funds must be harmonised with Switzerland's national strategies, in particular the IBM strategy.²⁵ When prioritising the use of BMVI funds, the results of the Schengen evaluations and the vulnerability assessments must also be taken into account. The findings from Switzerland's future national quality control mechanism will provide important indicators for prioritising the use of BMVI funds (see Chapter 7k).

One challenge when using BMVI funds is to provide financial support not only for largescale projects, but also for small and medium-sized projects and beneficiaries. For small projects and small beneficiaries, the amount of work involved in obtaining BMVI funding is often too high or not cost-effective. For this reason, Switzerland's BMVI management system should be simplified in order to provide small and medium-sized beneficiaries with special support when applying for BMVI funding.

Strategic objectives

- I1: Align the use of BMVI funds with national strategies, in particular the IBM strategy, taking into account the results of the Schengen evaluations and vulnerability assessments.
- I2: Simplify the national BMVI management system and give special support to small and medium-sized beneficiaries when applying for BMVI funding.

m) Fundamental rights



All Swiss authorities, including the border control authorities, are required to respect, protect and promote fundamental and human rights and to recognise international law. The activities of the border control authorities must comply with national, European and international treaties and legal provisions such as the European Convention on Human Rights²⁶, the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war²⁷, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the EU Return Directive, the Federal Constitution²⁸ and cantonal legislation (e.g. police laws). Switzerland also recognises the principle of non-refoulement. Any person may appeal to the competent

authority if they believe that a border control officer has violated their fundamental rights. If a criminal offence has been committed, a complaint can be lodged with the prosecuting authority.

In recent years, the border control, police and migration authorities have been involved in national strategies (e.g. National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking²⁹, National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism³⁰) because they ultimately have to implement the measures contained therein. The strategies include the observance and protection of fundamental and human rights and the protection of vulnerable persons, including children, unaccompanied minor asylum seekers and victims of crime. They contain measures for awareness-raising, training, cooperation and information-sharing between state and non-state actors. These national strategies, or action plans, provide the authorities with guidance on complying with fundamental rights in their operational activities, risk analyses, planning and return measures, as well as in cooperation with external partners. Switzerland also has border management directives on caring for vulnerable children and unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.

Fundamental and human rights, including the right to human dignity, protection against discrimination during controls, the principle of proportionality, intercultural communication and the interviewing of migrants, are already part of the basic and further training of personnel who carry out controls or are involved in returns. It is important that vulnerable persons, victims of human trafficking and people smuggling as well as their perpetrators are identified. To this end, training is essential as it enhances the ability of personnel to recognise new trends and cross-border crime at an early stage. Exchanging information with other Schengen

25 Switzerland's participation in the BMVI is subject to the supplementary agreement being concluded and the relevant legal provisions coming into force in Switzerland.

26 [Convention](#) for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

27 [Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war](#).

28 [Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation](#).

29 [National Action Plan](#) to Combat Human Trafficking 2023–2027 of 18 December 2022.

30 [National Action Plan](#) to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2023-2027.

states on phenomena such as people smuggling and human trafficking is also important: knowledge-based intelligence, risk analyses and situation pictures help staff to identify human rights violations more quickly (see Chapter 7c). In addition to the above-mentioned national strategies, the EU's Fundamental Rights Strategy and the Frontex Action Plan are further instruments that can be used for raising awareness and training border management personnel on respecting, protecting and promoting fundamental and human rights.

The National Commission for the Prevention of Torture (NCPT) is an independent body that monitors the activities of all Swiss authorities to ensure they respect fundamental rights. The NCPT is Switzerland's national preventive mechanism under OPCAT³¹ and is particularly proactive in the area of returns. Observers have access to all operational areas of border management. The border control authorities welcome this independent monitoring as it helps to ensure that fundamental rights are respected in their operational activities.

In May 2023, Switzerland's National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) commenced its activities. The task of the institution is to protect and promote human rights in Switzerland. In future, it could become a further partner in integrated border management, for example in the fields of training, raising awareness and monitoring fundamental rights. It should be examined whether the NHRI be given a specific mandate to monitor compliance with fundamental rights in border management, border controls and returns as well as to investigate violations (as a national mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights).

Strategic objectives

- m1: Train border control, police and migration authorities to respect and protect fundamental and human rights, prevent violations and identify vulnerable persons, including children and unaccompanied minors.
- m2: Continue the independent mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights, with independent observers monitoring the activities of border control authorities for compliance with fundamental and human rights.

n) Education and training



Basic training according to uniform standards as well as further training based on individual functions and tasks are important prerequisites for professional, legally compliant and high-quality border management. Training personnel is key to ensuring the operational capability of border control authorities in the face of ongoing digitalisation and process automation, as well as the ever-increasing sophistication of criminals' *modi operandi* using modern technologies.

The border control authorities are responsible for training their own staff to fulfil the tasks assigned to them under cantonal, national or international law. However, in some areas there is currently a lack of uniform basic and advanced training in Switzerland.

Taking into account current European standards³² and national operational requirements, tasks and legal responsibilities, IBM Strategy III establishes uniform courses of instruction and common training standards at national level (Swiss Core Curriculum). This objective was approved in principle as part of the previous IBM strategy in the reFRONT project, and the Federal Council and the CCJPD have instructed the authorities to expand on it.

In order to consistently implement the right in Europe to cross borders and return, education and training should aim at attaining the highest standards and best practices. Particular emphasis should be placed on the areas of international protection, the protection of vulnerable persons (including children and unaccompanied minors), respect for fundamental rights and personal data protection.

Staff training (e.g. on document forgery) must be promoted and course modules offered that are tailored to national needs. In addition, synergies with Frontex training courses should be optimised, also in order to avoid duplication.

Increasing digitalisation is changing both the processes and the areas of responsibility of border management authorities. With future systems such as the EES, data will no longer only have to be synchronised, but also increasingly recorded and mutated. Sufficient human resources with specific requirement profiles are therefore needed for these tasks. It is also essential that border control, police and migration personnel receive specific training on computer-based search options so that they can use the new systems and technologies in practice and in compliance with legal provisions (in particular data protection regulations).

31 [Optional Protocol](#) to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT).

32 Particularly with respect to the Common Core Curriculum (CCC). Other European standards are relevant to other areas, such as the CIRAM in risk analysis.


Advanced training should include closer cooperation between the national authorities in the form of exchanging practical experience. The mutual exchange of knowledge or specific expertise from practical experience and best practices with partner authorities in Switzerland and abroad is therefore to be encouraged.

Switzerland is committed to high-quality joint training programmes, also at European level. It promotes exchanges between partner authorities and provides trained and experienced specialists for Frontex training courses.

Strategische Ziele

- n1: The border control authorities have sufficient personnel to handle the volume of passengers and who are trained according to uniform standards.
- a4/n2: Ensure that border control, police and migration authorities have staff who are trained in using new technologies and systems, allowing them to make effective use of database search options within the regulatory framework.
- a5/n3: Foster experience-sharing between national authorities as well as with partner authorities abroad in order to acquire knowledge and expertise.

o) Research and innovation



Research and innovation are important instruments, besides others, for addressing the increasing complexity and diversity of cross-border crime and the modern technologies used for this purpose. Through research and innovation, tools and solutions can be developed for integrated border management that keep pace with ongoing digitalisation and interconnectivity, and counter the scarcity of resources and growing risks of complexity.

Border management operations can benefit from technological advances and developments in order to become more interoperable, cost-efficient and sustainable. Therefore, technological developments, such as artificial intelligence, and innovative solutions should be promoted and implemented to support the growing demands of integrated border management. This requires the interoperability of systems and the harmonisation of processes to ensure efficiency (see Chapter 7a). Innovative solutions, including the use of artificial intelligence, must be in line with legal requirements, such data protection regulations, and respect the fundamental and human rights of travellers. Federal legislation will enable the authorities in Switzerland to carry out innovative pilot projects in the future.³³

Switzerland has an interest in cooperating with the European border management authorities in research and innovation and is therefore involved in the European Innovation Centre for Internal Security. This cooperation allows the Swiss authorities to network even better with national partner authorities and define a common approach on research and innovation. Closer cooperation should also be sought with actors such as the Federal Office for Cybersecurity, the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation, the Federal Statistical Office (Federal Competence Centre for Data Science and Artificial Intelligence) and national institutions such as ETH Zurich and EPFL Lausanne, who play an important role in artificial intelligence research.

Strategic objectives

- o1: IBM partners are networked at national level with other actors in the fields of innovation and research. Switzerland remains committed to the European Innovation Centre for Internal Security.
- o2: Promote research and innovation on border management, especially through application-oriented pilot projects, and share the findings at national and European level.

³³ The future Federal Act on the Use of Electronic Means to Carry Out Official Tasks (EMOTA) provides a legal basis for pilot projects. The extent to which this piece of legislation can also be used in the context of integrated border management must be examined ([BBI 2022 805](#)) (German, French, Italian). Digital Federal Administration [Strategy](#) of 8 December 2023.

8 Implementation

In order to achieve these strategic objectives, the responsible stakeholders must define measures and implement them with an action plan. The expanded Border Steering Group is responsible for implementing the strategy and action plan and monitoring implementation. It also acts as a supervisory and approval body. The measures are financed by the relevant federal and cantonal authorities. These authorities are also responsible for providing the necessary human resources. The fund mentioned in Chapter 71 (BMVI) is a further funding option. However, not all IBM-relevant measures can be cofinanced through this fund.

9 Overview of strategic objectives

a)	Border control
a1/c3	Make national risk analyses products (including up-to-date situational pictures) available to the authorities concerned promptly and directly.
a2	Improve access to information and further promote the exchange of data between border control authorities for efficient border management.
a3/j2	Define and procure border management infrastructure and system requirements jointly or in a coordinated manner.
a4/n2	Ensure that border control, police and migration authorities have staff who are trained in using new technologies and systems, allowing them to make effective use of database search options within the regulatory framework.
a5/n3	Foster experience-sharing between national authorities as well as with partner authorities abroad in order to acquire knowledge and expertise.
a6	Ensure that the border control authorities have at their disposal a technical and physical infrastructure adapted to the volume of passengers and to the new systems, which enables efficient and legally compliant border control.
c)	Risk analysis
c1	Establish a formal national risk analysis structure that involves all the relevant stakeholders, with defined tasks and responsibilities.
c2	Compile national risk analyses products based on the needs of stakeholders and in line with current European standards. The federal and cantonal authorities contribute their resources, data and findings to preparing these analyses.
a1/c3	Make national risk analyses products (including up-to-date situational pictures) available to the authorities concerned promptly and directly.
d)	Information exchange and cooperation with member states and Frontex
d1	Contribute in quantitative and qualitative terms to the resources required by Frontex, while taking into account Switzerland's own requirements.
d2	Provide the technical and human resources necessary for the timely exchange of information, in compliance with legal regulations.
d3	Provide the necessary resources for conducting vulnerability assessments and remedy any vulnerabilities identified at Switzerland's external borders.
e)	Cooperation between national authorities
e1	Strengthen cooperation between the border management authorities and law enforcement services in order to combat cross-border crime.

e2	Have a body of federal and cantonal representatives with the authority and budget to define and monitor binding operational standards and joint processes for coordinating border management.
e3	Centrally coordinate training, risk analyses, processes, infrastructure and technology.
g)	Cooperation with third countries
g1	Promote a statutory framework for visas at European level that facilitates legal travel but prevents illegal migration and threats to national security. Utilise scope for action with regard to visa procedures in order to achieve Switzerland's migration policy objectives.
g2	Regularly assess the deployment of liaison officers (ALOs, PAs, FOCBS attachés and ILOs) according to priorities and the situation on the ground in order to foster close cooperation with third country authorities and the international liaison network.
g3	Conduct migration dialogues with the main countries of origin and transit, and seek to formalise cooperation through agreements or partnerships in order to improve migration management.
g4	Strengthen strategic and operational cooperation with third countries in the areas of readmission and human trafficking/illegal migration prevention, thereby making a contribution to European integrated border management.
h)	Checks inside the Schengen area (incl. internal border controls)
h1	Use external border control instruments (EU information systems) combined with technical and operational measures in the internal border area to help detect and prevent unauthorised secondary movements, illegal migration and cross-border crime.
h2	Use police- and customs-related instruments to increase security within the internal border area.
h3	Improve the knowledge and skills of the authorities (police, customs, FOCBS) for carrying out controls within the internal borders through specific training.
h4	Promote risk-based planning in order to deploy personnel and technical resources more effectively (improve capacities).
i)	Return
i1	Strengthening the role of Frontex in providing member states with operational support in all phases of the return process.
i2	Use Frontex services in specific areas of the return process.
i3	Promote and increasingly use European programmes for voluntary return and reintegration.
i4	To enable more proactive planning, Switzerland is working at European level to improve data collection and comparability as well as analyses on return, reintegration and readmission. This will be combined with the further development of its digital return management system.
j)	Use of state-of-the art technology
j1	External border control staff work with uniform systems and processes. All authorities (police, customs, FOCBS) carry out immigration law-related checks on persons in Switzerland in accordance with Schengen standards and uniform processes.
a3/j2	Define and procure border management infrastructure and system requirements jointly or in a coordinated manner.
j3	Explore and promote new advanced, interoperable technical systems and solutions for increasing the efficiency of border management and conserving resources.

k)	Quality control mechanisms
k1	Switzerland has a suitable quality control mechanism that covers all integrated border management components.
k2	National-level planning and priorities are based on the results of Swiss and European control mechanisms. The findings from applying these mechanisms are taken into account when using EU funding instruments.
k3	The federal and cantonal authorities provide the necessary number of qualified experts for each area of the Schengen evaluations.
l)	Solidarity mechanisms
l1	Align the use of BMVI funds with national strategies, in particular the IBM strategy, taking into account the results of the Schengen evaluations and vulnerability assessments.
l2	Simplify the national BMVI management system and give special support to small and medium-sized beneficiaries when applying for BMVI funding.
m)	Fundamental rights
m1	Train border control, police and migration authorities to respect and protect fundamental and human rights, prevent violations and identify vulnerable persons, including children and unaccompanied minors.
m2	Continue the independent mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights, with independent observers monitoring the activities of border control authorities for compliance with fundamental and human rights.
n)	Education and training
n1	The border control authorities have sufficient personnel to handle the volume of passengers and who are trained according to uniform standards.
a4/n2	Ensure that border control, police and migration authorities have staff who are trained in using new technologies and systems, allowing them to make effective use of database search options within the regulatory framework.
a5/n3	Foster experience-sharing between national authorities as well as with partner authorities abroad in order to acquire knowledge and expertise.
o)	Research and innovation
o1	IBM partners are networked at national level with other actors in the fields of innovation and research. Switzerland remains committed to the European Innovation Centre for Internal Security.
o2	Promote research and innovation on border management, especially through application-oriented pilot projects, and share the findings at national and European level.

Figure 2: Overview of strategic objectives

10 Annex

Sources

National sources

- [National Action Plan](#) to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2023-2027
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