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Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP
Federal Office of Police fedpol



annual report fedpol 2017



Switzerland is no island

The leader of several criminal gangs specialising in extortion and armed robbery is on the move around Europe. The man goes about his 'business affairs', investing his ill-gotten gains. He also comes to Switzerland regularly. A European investigation team that includes fedpol monitors his comings and goings, patiently documenting his every move in order to foil his activities and dismantle the criminal gangs he heads.

A Swiss couple has been radicalised. The man spends a lot of time on the internet, communicating in particular with a group of young French people whose enthusiasm for jihadism he shares. A Swiss-French investigation team is set up and information is exchanged, giving impetus to the investigations. The

co-ordinated operation leads to the arrest of a dozen suspects.

A Swiss paedophile is spotted on the internet thanks to collaborative work by American and European police, including fedpol. The cantonal investigations show that the man has repeatedly committed sexual offences against minors. He will be convicted.

Crime fiction? No. These are just a few random examples of the numerous cases fedpol deals with every day. Crime today is a reflection of our society: interconnected, mobile, global. And Switzerland is no European island.

Our latest annual report illustrates this reality. All the stories have a common message: the importance of police co-operation. Police co-operation is


essential for responding to the terrorist challenge. It is essential for assembling joint investigation teams and enhancing our striking force. And it is essential for combating human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Police co-operation is in our DNA. It is our best weapon against crime today.

I wish you an enjoyable read.

Nicoletta della Valle, Director





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Carte blanche for Christoph Frei

Christoph Frei, an inveterate cyclist and amateur electric guitar player from Bern, was given a carte blanche to illustrate the cover and six double pages of our annual report according to the theme 'Switzerland is no island'. The result: neither atoll nor ocean, but a Switzerland that is dynamic and versatile at the centre of a changing world. And a Switzerland that is doing what it does best: committing its best resource to the cause – its co-operation.
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fedpol at the centre of policing in Switzerland

A portrait.

Terrorism *In 2017, Switzerland reinforced its arsenal of counterterrorism measures. From amendments to the Swiss Criminal Code, to preventive policing measures and a national action plan to counter and prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, Switzerland is taking a tough approach to counter the terrorist threat.*

Global approach to a global threat

It's 4am on a November morning at fedpol's offices in Bern. The officer in charge, investigators, analysts, observation and intervention units, and liaison officers are working flat out, focused on the task at hand, each in their respective role. Contact is made with the French teams. In the cantons of Vaud and Neuchâtel, the teams are in place – federal and cantonal forces will work together today. Operation MAJOR can begin.

The story began several months earlier when fedpol received information from its international colleagues regarding a group of young people whose online exchanges appeared anything but harmless and suggested a worrying enthusiasm for so-called Islamic State. Among them were several French citizens and a Swiss national. The Swiss national was known to fedpol as he had been convicted for domestic violence by the public prosecutor in the Canton of Vaud several years earlier. During the investigation, propaganda

images were found on his phone. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland therefore opened criminal proceedings.

The information from our international colleagues gave the proceedings a boost. A joint investigation unit was set up with France to facilitate the exchange of information and to allow the French and Swiss investigations to benefit from each other's findings.

Secret virtual exchanges

The group of young people in this story were communicating online. A lot. And this is a common feature in terrorist investigations these days. While we are aware of the frightening effectiveness of jihadist propaganda on websites that are accessible to everyone, we also know that jihadists use online technologies to communicate with each other and plan attacks. They use closed chats, which the police are unable to access through technical means as they are encrypted.

To access these chats you have to be a group member. And to be a group member you have to prove your credentials and go through a recruitment process to win over the trust of the ringleaders, who may be unknowingly duped into accepting undercover police officers into their group. This is what we call covert online operations (see box), an investigative tool the federal police currently lack.

Reinforcement of measures in 2017

This was one of the shortcomings identified during an analysis of existing counterterrorism instruments in Switzerland. Various projects were developed in 2017 to address these shortcomings. To strengthen enforcement, a number of provisions in the Swiss Criminal Code are currently being amended. To step up prevention and reintegration efforts, the National Action Plan (NAP) to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism was adopted in November 2017.



Dusk falls over the rooftops
of a city.

In between these two instruments, the Federal Act on Police Counterterrorism Measures (PCTA), which was drawn up by fedpol, aims to supplement the NAP when NAP measures are not sufficient: when a person is first radicalised, when there is insufficient evidence to open criminal proceedings, or after a sentence has been served (see illustration on p. 9). These measures interact with each other and allow cases to be individually monitored in a bid to stem radicalisation.

Police co-operation is essential

The young Swiss man in the case above did not get this opportunity. When our international colleagues reported his online dealings, although he had already served his sentence for domestic violence, his radicalisation was already at an advanced stage and seemed to have also affected his wife.

Over the weeks that followed, police co-operation advanced the French-Swiss investigations, so much so that the French and Swiss public prosecutors finally decided to intervene. A joint operation was planned to question the members of the online group on both sides of the border.

It's 6am at fedpol's offices, and the French liaison officer tracking his colleagues' operations live announces that the first arrest has been made successfully. In the space of a few hours more arrests are made, one after the other. The young Swiss man, who is in France at the time, falls into the hands of the French police, while the teams on the ground in Neuchâtel arrest his wife. After their hearings, all nine suspects are handed over to the French and Swiss public prosecutors. Operation MAJOR is a success.

A summary of the planned policing measures

The measures have two objectives: preventing radicalised individuals from travelling to crisis zones, and cutting them off from their criminogenic environments in order to stem radicalisation and avert the danger.

- a) To prevent people travelling to crisis zones:
 - Withdrawal of identity documents and ban on leaving the country
 - Obligation to report regularly to a specific authority
- b) To isolate individuals from their criminogenic environments:
 - Exclusion orders forbid a person from entering a certain area during a certain period. In the most serious cases, exclusion orders may extend to house arrests.
 - Bans on contact: a person may be forbidden from having contact with other individuals who have a negative influence on them.
 - Discreet surveillance allows the movements of the persons concerned to be tracked, as well as the identity of those accompanying them. Every time they move from one country to the next, the information is stored in the Schengen Information System.

These measures are supplemented by other measures that allow them to be checked and implemented, such as localisation of mobile phones and use of electronic tags. These measures come under administrative (not criminal) law, are time-limited and may be contested in court.

Covert operations


Counterterrorism means combating criminal organisations, and these days all criminal organisations, including terrorists, use the internet and social media for propaganda and recruitment, to plan attacks, give out instructions and to communicate with one another. There are clear indications that terrorist organisations like Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are financed by organised crime. To understand the networks and their modus operandi, fedpol needs to be able to employ specific means – including outside of criminal proceedings – to carry out research online and on social media, as these are the preferred communication channels of criminal organisations.

Threat management

The planned measures are always implemented following examination of the individual case – and in a complementary manner. They are ordered by fedpol on the request of the canton managing the case:

Migration authorities	NGOs	Mental health services	Police
Education authorities	Social services	Others	Cantonal intelligence services

In the majority of cases, the cantonal measures provided for in the NAP (e.g. counselling and integration measures) are sufficient.




← Canton

If radicalisation is at an advanced stage, the cantonal intelligence services can, for example, engage in preventive dialogue.



← Canton

In cases where it is feared a terrorist act may be committed, the authorities can demand certain behaviour of a person and impose it, if necessary, through compulsory measures.



← Canton and Confederation

***Cyber & Crime** Criminals also operate in the digital world, exploiting all the loopholes the internet has to offer. But what does this mean for the police, and how can they prepare for this challenge?*

Facetime with terror

"I'll explain everything as soon as I get back". These were the words of a young Swiss man writing to a childhood friend on Facebook Messenger as he sat in a Turkish jail waiting to return to Switzerland. He had been accused of planning to go to Syria to join Islamic State. When he returned to Switzerland, he was arrested. After his arrest, the investigators not only read this exchange with a friend, but also many conversations he had had with other jihadi sympathisers before he left the country. The man was a recent convert and had quickly become radicalised. And what encouraged him to take this path? The internet.

Searching for digital clues

The internet in general and social media in particular act as both facilitator and catalyst in the radicalisation process. They are also used for covert communication. Encrypted messaging services are particularly popular with terrorists, who take advantage of end-to-end encryption to communicate in a secure environment. The individuals from French-speaking Switzerland who were

arrested in France in November 2017 as part of a joint operation were also communicating with young people in France in this way (see p. 6). When their house was searched, two laptops, eight tablets and seven smartphones were seized. Investigators had to process 1.5 terabytes of data, including close to 50,000 chats, around 450,000 images and 4,600 videos.

And this is no exception: in every terrorism case, investigators uncover a wealth of information. They unearth propaganda videos, photos of beheadings in conflict zones, and thousands of chats in various messaging applications on smartphones, tablets and computers.

Encryption and the volume of data pose various problems for the police. First: large parts of the internet are out of the police's reach because they are unable to read encrypted chats. That needs to change (see p. 8). Second: the fast-moving nature of data means that a Facebook profile might be there today and gone tomorrow. Third: big data means that police work is like searching for a needle in a haystack. But

digital tracks are increasing the size of the haystack. And fourth: processing of data for prosecutors is more necessary than ever. Digital clues are now considered the most important evidence in criminal cases, but analysing big data is a laborious task. Clever algorithms help the police manage such large volumes of data (see p. 14).

Working with internet companies

It is not only in securing evidence in criminal cases that the internet plays an important role, but also in searches. For example, the US authorities contacted fedpol with an urgent request to identify an individual behind an email as somebody had made specific threats regarding a killing spree at a high school. But fedpol's exchange with the email provider was unsuccessful because the company's business model is based on login data not being stored. And this company is not an isolated case. Many providers are unable to reconstruct client data. So fedpol is trying to engage with internet companies to discuss solutions and to highlight that the misuse of their services

can become a reputational risk for the companies themselves and for Switzerland.

Like us, criminals move around in the virtual world and in the real world. If a criminal checks into a hotel in the real world, the hotel is obliged to co-operate with the prosecution authorities. The internet should be no exception. Co-operation has been stepped up between prosecution authorities and internet companies in recent years. Major players such as Google and Facebook have set up extensive content moderation centres in order to detect and remove criminal content more quickly. They handle reports from the prosecution authorities as a priority: fedpol, for example, has the status of 'trusted flagger' with Google. In 2017, fedpol flagged an average of one YouTube video a week containing violent jihadist propaganda.

In Switzerland, internet and telephony providers are not yet legally required to block access to criminal internet content. They can, however, block access to criminal sites on the basis of their company ethics and general terms and conditions. This

co-operation has proven effective in the case of websites containing child pornography. In 2017, 1,536 websites worldwide were shut down at fedpol's request.

New competence centre

Crime is increasingly shifting to the virtual world and employing digital means. The police need to adopt a new approach to respond to these challenges. Accordingly, fedpol and the cantons plan to set up a joint network of specialists who will work together to help combat cybercrime, share their experience and provide continuing education and training.

The reorganisation of the Federal Criminal Police will see fedpol pool its expertise in a cybercrime, computer forensics and telecommunications monitoring competence centre. This will mean that all elements that are involved in combating cybercrime will be combined in one department. The national cyber competence centre will assist with fedpol investigations in federal criminal proceedings, and will also support the cantons with

their investigations, especially if they have a national or international dimension.

The crucial point, however, is that combating cybercrime should not be left solely to the experts. Every police officer should have a basic knowledge of how to use digital devices. For this reason the Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders of Switzerland has launched a training campaign in collaboration with fedpol. In 2018 the Swiss Police Institute will offer online training courses for all police officers, including fedpol investigators.

Terrorism An unprecedented study conducted by a fedpol analyst pulled apart ten criminal proceedings to try and better understand the radicalisation process and the experiences of a sample of Swiss jihadists. It concluded that while there is no such thing as a typical profile, the cases have a number of points in common.

No such thing as a typical profile

Entry bans

128

Issued in 2016

150

Issued in 2017

36

Still under review
(end of 2017)

An increasing number of deportations

If a foreign national presents a threat to national security, fedpol can deport the person if they are in

Switzerland, or impose an entry ban to prevent the person from entering the country. As the jihadist threat has increased, fedpol has made consistent use of these possibilities.

In 2017, 13 deportation orders and 58 entry bans were issued in relation to jihadism.

The fight against terrorism would be simple if we could establish with certainty the photofit of a prospective jihadist. Then it would simply be a case of recognising the typical jihadist profile and taking specific tailored action. Unfortunately, the reality is somewhat more complex.

A qualitative study conducted by a fedpol analyst explored this question. The study sifted through ten criminal proceedings conducted by the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG). Several thousand pages of reports and statements were painstakingly analysed and interpreted to gain a better understanding of the profile of these young people suspected of supporting so-called Islamic State.

A novel approach

The study takes a novel approach that is based on multidisciplinary criteria. Analysis of the individuals' biographies is supplemented by an assessment of psychological, ideological and religious aspects. The study also looked at the individuals' world view and political vision, with socioeconomic data rounding off the picture. The factors that influence or trigger the radicalisation process are many and varied. This multidisciplinary approach allows a better understanding of the complex realities of radicalisation, producing a more nuanced set of results.

An unstable history

The study's first finding is that there is no such thing as a typical profile. The jihadists analysed in the study were of different ages, with different employment histories, from different socioeconomic classes, and were Swiss and foreign nationals.

In spite of that, they did share a number of common features.

Many had a rocky educational or occupational history. Whether they dropped out of school, failed to complete an apprenticeship

or were unable to hold down a job, they generally had trouble integrating in the world of work, and their capacity to take on responsibility was limited. This resulted in a lack of prospects and social mobility.

The individuals analysed were critical of the world and wanted to rebel. They were anti-everything: anti-western values, anti-authority, anti-norms, anti-world order.

A violent past

The jihadists analysed often had histories of petty crime. As well as their criminal records, many had accumulated debts and were involved in debt collection proceedings. They exhibited aggressive behaviour and had a history of violence.

These young people on the margins of society who don't identify with the society in which they live and who have violent tendencies offer fertile ground for jihadist propaganda: What if these are the real values? Would I fit into that world order? And could I redeem myself by erasing the present? Could I become a hero?

The importance of environment

None of the jihadists studied became radicalised alone in front of a screen. While the internet facilitates and accelerates the process, real-life meetings play a decisive role in the radicalisation process. An individual's environment is therefore a central criminogenic factor.

This highlights the importance of the National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (see p. 8). Detecting the first signs of trouble in a young person early on, improving their social and professional integration and even being able to take action in their own environment to eradicate the harmful influences are steps which, if taken together, based on an individual and multidisciplinary approach, can counter the radicalisation process.

Deportation orders

1

Issued in 2016

13

Issued in 2017

31

Still under review
(end of 2017)

Terrorism While Europol does not have an executive mandate, it provides European police forces with expertise, channels for exchanging information and analytical capabilities. The support it provides to fedpol is invaluable.

Europol support boosts efficiency

It is a November morning at fedpol's Operations Centre (see p. 6). A special team is waiting patiently for Operation MAJOR to end, poised to spring into action. The team in question is Europol's Emergency Response Team (ERT), which has been deployed at the instigation of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland to provide analytical support to an ongoing investigation. Its mission: to analyse computers, smartphones and other electronic equipment seized during a search of the suspects' homes.

When the equipment arrives at fedpol, the highly specialised team sets to work with fedpol analysts. They go through the digital content with a fine-toothed comb. As they are directly linked up to Europol databases, the team will be able to provide information relevant to the ongoing investigation in record time.

The team is part of Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), which has been in operation since January 2016 and in which fedpol participates. The idea for the centre emerged in the wake of the Paris attacks in November 2015. The tangled links between the various perpetrators involved in the Paris attacks demonstrated the importance of international information sharing to counter the terrorist threat. The idea of the ECTC is to support European police forces by providing expertise and unprecedented analysis capabilities.

Comprehensive data recording

The ECTC uses a range of highly effective tools that are able to deliver a very rapid in-depth analysis of all the data linked to an investigation in order to compile a picture of the networks and to detect links

between the various pieces of information collected: who uses which cars, which phone numbers, which web chats? Who is in touch with whom? Using which channel? To do this, the ECTC has thousands of data sets at its disposal which are supplied by all European police forces, in particular from the investigations conducted by the French and Belgian forces following the attacks that were carried out in those countries. This involves several terabytes of data, as well as the information provided by all the European police forces, including that of Switzerland.

Analysing open sources

The ECTC also specialises in the analysis of open sources. For some years now, thousands of pages of online jihadist propaganda have been patiently collected and saved by Europol.



Liaison officers at the heart of Europol

Europol's leverage is linked to the quality of its experts, but also to the quality and quantity of information provided by European police forces. Liaison officers who specialise in terrorism from sixteen countries involved in the ECTC are stationed at Europol, including one from fedpol. They play a key role: establishing links with ongoing cases in their countries, advising investigators to escalate information to Europol, championing the advantages of ECTC services and co-ordinating requests for support and collaboration. They are trusted by their national police forces and allow information to be directly shared with Europol more rapidly.

For example, when a terrorist attack occurs the liaison officers convene straight away, and the officer from the country affected, who is in touch with his or her national authorities, passes on the necessary information to the other liaison officers, who can immediately look for and report any links to their countries. This results in enhanced European police co-operation.

This work has very tangible benefits. The ERT team compares the websites, photos and propaganda videos discovered on the seized computers and phones with the content catalogued and evaluated by Europol. The comparison is automated and the results (number of propaganda websites visited, number of jihadi videos downloaded etc.) are available within minutes. Without this tool, every photo, video and website would have to be examined and analysed manually. Europol's preliminary work and expertise saves Swiss investigators a great deal of time.

At fedpol's Operations Centre, the ERT team makes good use of these tools: searching for links with other jihadists known to European police forces, viewing information from the investigation that will help analysts point investigators in the right direction, and evaluat-

ing propaganda content on computers and phones thanks to comparison with Europol databases. The ERT team delivers detailed reports to fedpol, which can be used as evidence in a trial.

Financial analyses

Analysis of financial flows is another advantage of Europol. In particular, such analyses have uncovered the terrorist financing activities of many individuals in Europe and in Switzerland, where proceedings are still under way.

The support that Europol's ECTC provides to fedpol is vital. It allows fedpol to respond more swiftly and efficiently, lending it additional leverage. At the heart of domestic and international police co-operation is fedpol, and Europol is an essential partner.





***Explosives precursors** Once again Europe was the scene of terrorist attacks in 2017. In London, Manchester, St. Petersburg and Barcelona, terrorists used home-made bombs manufactured with substances found in everyday household products. These substances are known as precursors. In Switzerland, products containing such precursors are freely available. In its counterterrorism strategy, the Federal Council has proposed pragmatic regulations to prevent Switzerland from becoming a shopping paradise for terrorists.*

Switzerland – a shopping paradise for terrorists?

Eyewitness accounts of the scenes of panic and horror portray the violence of the terror attacks perpetrated in Europe in 2017. All these attacks have one thing in common: the explosions were caused by homemade devices. On 3 April in the St. Petersburg subway, a homemade explosive device packed full of nuts and bolts killed 11 people. On 22 May in Manchester, the attacker was armed with an improvised explosive device. The attack killed 22 people and injured around 60. On the London tube on 15 September, a makeshift bomb was hidden in a white bucket and covered with a plastic bag. Fortunately, only 29 people suffered minor injuries as a result of the explosion. The concentration of products used by the terrorist was too weak to cause more serious damage.

Although Switzerland has so far been spared from such an attack, it runs the very real risk of becoming the place where terrorists come to stock up. Switzerland remains the only country in the heart of Europe where substances that can be used to manufacture explosives are still available without restrictions. The European Union introduced regulations in 2014 restricting the sale and use of explosives precursors to contain the risk of misuse by individuals. To alleviate this situation and given the current terrorist threat, the Federal Council has decided to regulate distribution of explosives precursors for individuals, to raise awareness of the risk of misuse among industrial players in the sectors concerned, and to encourage them to report suspect cases. A draft bill

proposes regulations to restrict access to such substances for individuals.

All the ingredients for an explosive belt


Since 1 September 2016, it has been possible to report any suspicious transactions (purchases, losses or thefts) to fedpol. This reporting option is voluntary. It is available to anybody, but is aimed primarily at the sectors concerned such as pharmacies, which are the direct sales outlets for individuals. It is also aimed at specialist shops whose products contain high concentrations of precursors (such as swimming pool cleaning products), farmers (certain fertilisers can be used to make bombs), and fedpol's partners (e.g. cantonal police corps, the Federal Customs Administration and international partners).



On 3 April 2017, Ekaterina told Sputnik news:

“At the time of the explosion I was in the subway carriage on the blue line, heading towards the subway station Nevsky Prospect. All of a sudden the train stopped. The people around me didn’t understand what was going on. We were told that all the exits and entrances were blocked. [...] People were panicking.”

An explosion had just occurred on the St. Petersburg subway.



After leaving the Ariana Grande concert in Manchester on 22 May 2017, Josh, one of the singer’s fans, told BBC News:

“Everyone had started to leave and then we heard a huge bang. [...] It was surreal, like something out of a film. There were people covered in blood. Everyone was trying to get out of there as fast as they could and people were crashing into the walls. It was horrific.”



On 15 September 2017, Robyn was just arriving at the tube station when she saw people trying to escape. She told the BBC:

“I went into the station, there was blood on the floor and people were running down the escalators shouting ‘get out.’”

London’s Parsons Green tube station had just been the target of a terror attack.

The awareness-raising measures have paid off: a total of 37 cases have been reported, but none have so far turned out to be an issue. For example, in May 2017, a pharmacy reported an online purchase to fedpol. The buyer, who was resident in Switzerland, had ordered hydrochloric acid, acetone and hydrogen peroxide online. The quantities of the substances ordered appeared suspicious as there would have been enough to manufacture 1 to 2 kg of TATP, which is the content of one explosive belt of the type used in the Paris attacks. Officers at fedpol immediately verified the identity of the buyer in different police databases and with Europol. The person was not listed, so fedpol contacted the police in the canton where the individual lived in order to find out his motives. As it happened, the

individual was able to give a credible explanation of why he required the substances as part of his job. The alert was lifted.

Pragmatic regulations

The draft bill aims to restrict access for individuals. The concentration of the substance present determines which measure is taken. No restrictions are planned for products containing a weak concentration of the substances in question. For products with higher concentrations, the buyer and the product must be reported. Finally, for high-concentration products, a license will be required from fedpol. It is estimated that a total of around one hundred products will be affected by these regulations.

What are explosives precursors?

Explosives precursors are chemical substances found in everyday household products that can be used to manufacture homemade explosives. For example, hydrogen peroxide is an ingredient in disinfectant products for swimming pools. When mixed with acetone, these two substances can be used to manufacture TATP, known as acetone peroxide or ‘Mother of Satan’. This was used to manufacture explosive belts used in the Paris terror attacks on 13 November 2015. More recently, the jihadist cell responsible for carrying out the attacks in Barcelona had purchased 500 litres of acetone with a view to manufacturing TATP bombs.

Gun laws The European Union approved an amendment to its firearms directive on 14 March 2017. The amendment targets semi-automatic weapons. The danger of such weapons is that several rounds can be fired in succession without reloading. Under the European Firearms Directive, access to such weapons will be restricted and information will be shared more effectively between Schengen states.

Automatic rifles to stay in Swiss homes

What currently applies – and will stay the same in future

- ▶ Minimum age 18
- ▶ No criminal record for violent behaviour, posing a public threat or repeat offences.
- ▶ No weapons for individuals with psychiatric problems: those who wish to acquire a weapon should not show any signs of being a danger to themselves or to other people. If there are signs that someone represents a danger to themselves or others, the weapon will be confiscated or no weapon acquisition permit will be issued. Those who have to observe official or professional confidentiality, e.g. doctors, may report cases to the police.

Classification of firearms



Weapons that have to be declared:

Written contract detailing seller/buyer and weapon

Examples: single-shot rabbit slayers, airsoft guns, single-shot hunting rifles



Weapons for which a permit is required:

Application to cantonal firearms office for weapon acquisition permit

Examples: pistols, revolvers, army-issue weapons



Banned weapons:

In justified cases, a cantonal exemption permit may be issued to acquire such weapons

Examples: automatic firearms, rocket-propelled grenades, butterfly knives

What will change under the EU Firearms Directive

Now included in the banned weapons category



Automatic firearms which have been modified into semi-automatic firearms (e.g. Swiss army-issue weapons)



Semi-automatic long firearms that can fire more than 10 rounds without being reloaded (e.g. the civilian version of Swiss army-issue weapons)



Semi-automatic short firearms that can fire more than 20 rounds without being reloaded (e.g. handgun with large loading device)



Semi-automatic short firearms with a folding or telescoping stock

Exceptions for:

▶ Target shooters

Conditions:

Either member of a shooting society or evidence of regular target shooting
Certificate to be renewed every 5 and 10 years

▶ Collectors and museums

Conditions:

Proper storage of weapons
Weapons must be catalogued

For owners of weapons that are now banned:

- ▶ Legal possession must be reported to the relevant cantonal firearms office within three years
- ▶ Exception: weapon already in a register or issued by the army (service weapon)

Changes for dealers

- ▶ Marking requirements: all essential components of firearms must in future be marked
- ▶ Reporting requirement: all transactions in connection with firearms or essential components must be reported to the competent cantonal authorities

Improved information sharing in the Schengen zone

- ▶ To prevent the misuse of weapons, refusal to grant authorisation to acquire or possess a firearm must be disclosed to Schengen states on request.

What won't change

- ▶ **Acquisition of service weapon:** those who wish to keep their service weapon on completion of their military service may continue to do so. This is possible under the exemption clause which Switzerland negotiated with Brussels.
- ▶ **No central firearms register:** since 2016, all cantonal firearms registers have been interconnected via a platform, which substantially simplifies information sharing between the cantons and fedpol.
 - ▶ There will be **no medical or psychological tests.**
- ▶ **No obligation to be member of a society:** interested parties can find out about target shooting in a shooting society or at private shooting ranges. Shooting clubs regularly organise open days for interested persons. Private shooting ranges offer courses that are also open to non-members. angeboten, deren Besuch ohne Vereinsbeitritt möglich ist.
- ▶ **No impact on hunters:** semi-automatic firearms with magazines of this type are already banned for hunting.

Police co-operation Crime does not stop at cantonal or national borders. Successful police work therefore requires a continual exchange of information, both nationally and internationally. At the heart of this co-operation and on the front line is fedpol. One week on call with a duty officer.

On duty 24/7

→ **Partner liaison via the PCCC**
The fedpol-run Police and Customs Co-operation Centre in Chiasso and Geneva-Cointrin are also instruments of bilateral co-operation. They make cross-border co-operation with the police and customs authorities in Italy and France both faster and easier. The PCCCs support information-sharing and also help to ensure that all of the regional partners concerned (cantonal police forces, Swiss Border Guard and the Italian and French police) are notified of major operations. They also co-ordinate joint surveillance in the border area, and handle cross-border missions.

Monday,

8.30am:

Duty officer's handover report at the fedpol Operations Centre. The duty officer comes on shift and takes over operations from his departing colleague. How is the situation at national level? And internationally? The operations team reviews the previous week and discusses forthcoming events. What measures have been put in place? What do they particularly need to watch out for? What issues are attracting media coverage?

The week begins relatively quietly. A bomb has been found in Potsdam, but investigations so far do not indicate any terrorist link. In other news, → **an articulated lorry containing explosive hydrocarbons** has been stolen. Although the truck hasn't so far been spotted in Switzerland, the duty officer will monitor the case closely.

Following the handover report, he takes over the keys to the official car. For the next seven days he will be available around the clock. Starting now, he will be in constant contact with the fedpol Operations Centre – the main hub of police information exchange in Switzerland and abroad. He will evaluate the situation on an ongoing basis, organise co-operation between the agencies concerned, consult with partner authorities, make decisions, provide resources for any specific operations, and instigate any action that is required.

→ **INTERPOL – Global information exchange**

INTERPOL enables police forces around the world to exchange information on crime, around the clock. As the National Central Bureau for INTERPOL in Switzerland, fedpol has access to all INTERPOL databases and can communicate directly with all member states in a matter of seconds. INTERPOL can be used not only for information on criminals and missing persons, and to issue alerts, but also to transmit fingerprints or DNA profiles.

Tuesday,

2.20pm:

The Operations Centre receives a message from → **Interpol** in Rome. The Italians are asking fedpol, as well as INTERPOL in Wiesbaden and Vienna, for → **permission to conduct cross-border surveillance**. Two individuals who are under investigation for money laundering and organised crime are evidently on their way from Italy to Germany. On their way, they will pass through Switzerland or, possibly, take the Brenner route through Austria. Two Italian police officers are on their heels. Rome also sends the make and number plate of the car they are using.

The duty officer consults with a member of staff at the Operations Centre, and issues his Italian colleague with the authorisation they need to conduct the requested surveillance on Swiss territory. He also notifies → **the Police and Customs Co-operation Centre in Chiasso** and the fedpol surveillance unit.

Wednesday,

5.01pm:

fedpol has become aware of worrying WhatsApp messages. A man who, until recently, worked for a major Swiss company, has made a variety of threats. It is not clear whether he plans to harm himself or others. The cantonal police force concerned is taking the threats seriously, but to be able to verify them, the man – a French citizen – must be questioned. Since he is apparently in Spain, the cantonal police force notifies fedpol of the

→ **Proactively preventing attacks**

Terrorist attacks can be committed with few resources and virtually no planning. There have been a number of attacks in Europe in which the perpetrators have driven cars or trucks into crowds of people. Trucks and their cargoes are being stolen with increasing frequency. What do the thieves have in mind? The police investigate such cases in detail, because each one holds the danger that the vehicle and its load might be used for a terrorist attack. Switzerland is no exception here.

→ **Surveillance on neighbouring territory**

The aim of the agreement between Switzerland and Italy on co-operation between police and customs authorities is to combat cross-border crime, in particular close to the shared border in the cantons of Valais, Ticino and Graubünden. The agreement authorises both states to conduct surveillance of suspects on the sovereign territory of the other contractual party. The applicant state must nonetheless obtain the consent of the police authorities in the neighbouring state. Switzerland has concluded similar bilateral agreements with France, Germany, Austria and Liechtenstein.

case. The duty officer immediately launches enquiries, and notifies the Spanish and French authorities via → **Europol**.

The Spanish issue a Europe-wide alert for the man.

The duty officer consults with fedpol's liaison officer at Europol, notifies the cantonal police, and makes sure that all of the key duty managers can be contacted overnight.

→ **Europol – European-wide information exchange**
Switzerland works closely with European partners and Europol. Three fedpol liaison officers are stationed with Europol, and fedpol also contributes to many working groups and projects, particularly those addressing the fight against terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling (cf. also p. 14).

Thursday, 2.35pm:

A concerned father appears at the fedpol reception desk. His children have evidently become radicalised, and he has travelled across Switzerland to report them to the federal police. The interview does not raise any suspicion that a criminal act has been committed. Nonetheless, fedpol notifies the Federal Intelligence Service.

Saturday, 7.27pm:

The previous day, an unknown individual went up to the reception of a particular organisation and handed over a letter written in blood. To find out whether or not the blood belongs to a person reported missing two weeks earlier, the cantonal police force concerned needs a DNA sample from a family member in the United Kingdom. They therefore contact fedpol. Before Saturday evening is over, fedpol staff have assumed co-ordination of the case and have sent the request to their colleagues in the UK.

Just a few minutes later: The Swiss Border Guard has detained three suspicious individuals at a border crossing. A neighbouring country has entered an alert concerning one of the men in the → **Schengen Information System**, requesting discreet surveillance. The reason is that he has been sharing jihadist content on Facebook and sympathises with the IS terrorist organisation. The discreet alert is intended to find out as much as possible about him and his companions. The greatest discretion is therefore required to avoid jeopardising the ongoing investigation. The man has also been banned by fedpol from entering Switzerland, in order to prevent him disseminating jihadist propaganda from a Swiss base, or planning or executing an attack in Switzerland.

The Swiss Border Guard examines the vehicle and finds suspicious deposits. The cantonal police force concerned therefore decides to detain the three men in police custody instead of sending them straight back to the country they wanted to leave. Their mobile telephones are taken to fedpol's IT forensics unit for data analysis. The traces found in the car might be residue from explosives. The case therefore falls under federal jurisdiction. The duty officer notifies the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland.

→ **Blind without Schengen**
The Schengen/Dublin Agreement enables data on investigations to be exchanged quickly and easily. Although not an EU member state, Switzerland has signed a Schengen association agreement. The logic behind this is that Switzerland is located at the heart of Europe, and crime is increasingly cross-border in nature. The Schengen Information System (SIS) provides the security services with the latest information on individuals wanted by the police, reported missing, or banned from entering a given country, as well as on stolen property such as vehicles or identity documents. Alerts can quickly be broadcast across Europe, and the police, border guards, other authorities within member states with access rights as well as Europol can query the database online immediately, whatever the time and place. Data is exchanged via national central bodies – in Switzerland's case via fedpol. The Swiss police search the SIS for information on individuals on average over 90,000 times a day.

**Sunday,
all day:**

The duty officer holds a series of telephone conferences. Along with the attorney general in charge, as well as representatives of the cantonal police force concerned and fedpol, he co-ordinates the investigation that is now underway. This involves interviewing the suspects, searching the vehicle, analysing the mobile telephones, and obtaining intelligence from the neighbouring country concerned.

**Monday,
8.30am:**

A week-long shift that began quietly comes to a busy end. As part of the handover report, the duty officer summarises the events of the previous few days and passes the baton to the new operations team. The suspects in the case that kept everyone so busy at the weekend are to be interviewed this morning. A second inspection of the vehicle by the Zurich Forensic Science Institute has since confirmed the findings of the first forensic examination. However, since the man in custody is an active gun-user, the traces found in the car might also be gunpowder residue. The three individuals therefore cannot be detained any longer. The cantonal police accompany the man back to the border and hand him over to the authorities of the neighbouring country. His two companions are released. The duty officer is awaiting final notification that this has happened, and only when it is received will his shift actually end.

There is also an update on the man who was threatening to commit an offence in the middle of the week. He has been detained and interviewed. The competent cantonal public prosecutor's office has commenced criminal proceedings against him on the grounds of threatening behaviour and attempted coercion.

The duty officer hands the keys to the official car to his successor. The fuel tank is full. The situation is much the same as it was a week ago – quiet – but the new duty team is ready around the clock, no matter what the next seven days will bring.

The case examples given above are real, but the week itself is not. In some instances, geographical information has been omitted for tactical reasons relating to ongoing investigations.








Hunting criminals together

Organised crime Criminal gangs from France are coming to Switzerland with plans for a new series of robberies. Their potential targets are gun shops, jewellers and banks. As part of its Armed Jewellery Robberies (AJR) project, fedpol is liaising with cantonal police forces and the French authorities. Arrests have already been made. A story of co-operation.



A break-in at a jeweller's shop on Zurich's Bahnhofstrasse: a police officer is securing the crime scene, while behind is a scene of destruction.

A December evening in 2016. Night is falling in a small rural village. Two men in a car keep driving backwards and forwards in front of a bank. They are on reconnaissance. They have already made their way through other towns in French-speaking Switzerland today, watching other targets, such as jewellers and even gun shops. They are preparing to strike. But fedpol is on to them. The tip-off came from the French police. Criminal gangs from France who are already known to have committed major robberies in Switzerland are planning to return. But where, exactly? Nobody knows. They could take their crime spree to any number of cantons. How can we find out where they will strike? How can we maintain an overview of the whole of Switzerland, with its 26 cantonal police forces?

Most importantly, which police force can act? The Armed Jewellery Robberies (AJR) project was set up in January 2014 in response to all of these questions. The project was initially overseen by the Neuchâtel cantonal police, before being handed over to fedpol. Its purpose is to draw up a strategy and allow cantonal and federal authorities to swiftly co-ordinate operations in the event of robberies being committed by criminal gangs.

Three crucial phases

The AJR project has since proven its worth. Each year, it helps to solve between 10 and 15 robbery cases in Switzerland and abroad. Its success is due in part to the three pillars on which it rests: co-ordination, situational analysis, and operational case management. In the initial phase, fedpol shares information with its partners, both foreign (the authorities in the other country, INTERPOL or Europol) and cantonal, thereby ensuring co-ordination. Then it analyses the situation to identify the perpetrators and the networks to which they belong. Over

time, fedpol has developed an effective method for analysing the criminal networks behind robberies in Switzerland and Europe, and the ways in which they operate. The analyses reveal initial patterns and allow fedpol and the cantonal police forces to develop a common operational strategy.

Ultimately, in agreement with the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG), fedpol can quickly launch initial enquiries (Art. 27 para. 2 Criminal Procedure Code) and act at the operational level.

Tracking suspicious activity

This is exactly what happens in the case of criminal gangs from France. Since no one canton can take the lead, claim jurisdiction or initiate proceedings, fedpol heads the operation as part of its emergency response. At the request of fedpol, the OAG decides to commence proceedings and to order the necessary compulsory measures (telephone taps, surveillance, GPS, etc.). The criminals arrive by train on Monday morning and meet up with their accomplices to conduct reconnaissance, the latter having already arranged all of the logistics, transport and accommodation. The fedpol operations plan goes into effect, and the cantons are notified. The French gang does not commit any offence, however. As soon as the men have completed their reconnaissance, they return to France. The French authorities then pick up the baton and follow the men closely.

Information becomes clearer as the months progress. The gang might be planning to rob a bank in Switzerland. This time, there are more details of the target and the canton: fedpol is again tipped off by the French authorities and thus begins to co-ordinate operations with the canton concerned. The case is referred to the competent cantonal police force, which manages the operation. In the meantime, fedpol liaises with France and supports the cantonal authorities by trailing the criminals as soon as they arrive on Swiss soil.

Finally, one day in the spring of 2017, they abandon their plan and return to France.

The exercise has not been in vain, however. The information gathered by fedpol is enough to prove the gang's involvement in preparations to commit robberies in Switzerland, as well as other offences committed on their way to Switzerland. In September 2017, several members of the gang are taken in for questioning in France. The searches conducted by the French authorities find handguns and assault rifles, latex masks, gloves, wigs and police uniform jackets. The men will appear before the French courts.

A tailor-made project

As a result of the AJR project, Switzerland boasts genuine expertise in this field. This expertise is recognised at the European level, and in January 2017 Switzerland joined forces with Europol and Austria to organise the first conference on the DIAMOND project – itself prompted by AJR. DIAMOND aims to promote closer co-ordination between European countries and to pool training and information on robberies committed by criminal networks operating throughout Europe and the countries around the Baltic and western Black Sea region. The AJR project thus underscores Switzerland's position in the fight against organised crime. Switzerland an island in the heart of Europe? On the contrary.

Money laundering *From one record to the next: the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) concerning money laundering and terrorist financing almost doubled in 2017. These reports trigger complex criminal proceedings. Before money laundering or terrorism financing can be prosecuted, there must be a detailed analysis of the financial intermediary's reported suspicions. The role of the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) at fedpol is to be strengthened in this regard.*

Rocketing number of SARs

At the beginning of November 2017, eleven princes and many former ministers were arrested in Saudi Arabia. The charge? Corruption. News of the operation, which attracted attention beyond the royal family, quickly reached Switzerland. Many financial institutions contacted MROS. Events in Saudi Arabia are a prime example of the fight against money laundering, in which developments in other countries are picked up by the Swiss banking sector and therefore also by fedpol.

In 2017, fedpol received 4,684 SARs, 51 of which concerned terrorist financing. The previous year there had been just 2,909 reports of suspected money laundering, and 25 of terrorist financing. Among the predicate offences that were reported, corruption was the most frequent. Financial intermediaries now have a greater awareness of the risks, leading them to review their client relationships on a regular basis.

About criminal mismanagement ...

This is illustrated by the case of one financial intermediary, which came across critical media coverage as part of an internal review. A European company at which one of its clients had held a top management position for over 15 years had been bailed out and taken over by the state. The bank's analysis of account transactions revealed that over one million euros had been credited to an account belonging to a domiciliary company. Since the financial intermediary could not rule out this payment being potential mismanagement on the part of the former executive board member, it reported the case to fedpol for further investigation.

An analysis by fedpol showed that the bank's client had transferred six-figure sums to his wife within a short period. These transfers gave rise to the suspicion that the money had been moved to disguise or evade possible state interven-

tion. Enquiries by fedpol with the relevant foreign financial intelligence unit (FIU) revealed that domestic proceedings had already been commenced against some of the individuals concerned on the grounds of an abuse of trust in business dealings, document fraud and money laundering. The foreign FIU indicated that it would like to collaborate with the Swiss authorities, so fedpol passed the information on to the competent criminal prosecution authorities in Switzerland.

... and bankers to the Mafia

A judgment passed by the Federal Criminal Court shortly before the end of the year shows what those who know the system will do to launder money from criminal activities. One banker helped members of the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta mafia for years to move money to Switzerland and abroad. For example, 'Ndrangheta members bought

a property near Chiasso railway station for CHF 1.8 million.

The former bank employee, later an accountant, had set up a system of countless numbered accounts for mafia members. Unlike a normal bank account, a numbered account uses a number or keyword instead of the name of the account holder. The account holders changed all the time to conceal the criminal origin of the money. The judgment also upheld fedpol's finding that Italian mafia organisations invest their money in the Swiss financial and real estate sectors.

More staff and more powers for MROS

The rise in SARs has naturally increased the number of cases that are still waiting to be investigated, and thus fedpol's workload. MROS referred 2,206 SARs to public prosecutors' offices in 2017, dismissed 1,055 cases, and has 1,423 still pending. While in 2013 an MROS analyst had to process some 169 reports during the year, the figure for 2017 had risen to 204. Consequently, fedpol was granted additional MROS personnel in 2017.

One particular aspect of MROS's work is also to be strengthened at the statutory level: in the future, MROS will be able to make enquiries in response to a report from a foreign FIU, even if it has not received a corresponding SAR from a Swiss financial intermediary. In 2017, fedpol received 4,119 enquiries from foreign FIUs concerning individuals or companies. It is unable to follow up on around 60 percent of these enquiries, because no report has been made in Switzerland. Traders will also be able to submit reports if they suspect that terrorism is being financed. This is included in the draft prepared by the Federal Council, which completed its consultation stage at the end of October 2017. This amendment is welcomed by the parties concerned and the cantons. Representatives of the banks also take a positive view of the change, providing that the condition of dual criminality is met. The bill will pass to the next stage in 2018: once the relevant dispatch has been adopted by the Federal Council, the Swiss parliament will vote on changing the law.

#dontbeamule

Time and again, criminals post fake job ads on the internet as bait for what are known as 'money mules'. The jobs sound enticing: work from home, earn well and enjoy flexibility. The only thing you have to do is make your personal bank account available. However, what many do not realise is that they are being used to launder money. In some cases, companies are invented or established specifically for this purpose, but there are also others in which criminals misappropriate the names of reputable existing companies.

It is difficult to say how many money mules are actually aware of the criminal intentions of those they work for. One thing is certain, however: ignorance is no defence in court. Anyone making their account available to move money around can be prosecuted under criminal law for aiding and abetting money laundering. Don't be a money-lauderer:

- Reputable employers will generally invite you for an interview.
- Reputable employers do not ask you to make your personal bank account available for business-related payments.
- If you recognise the name of the company supposedly advertising, call to ask them if the job offer is genuine.

What is money laundering?

Money originating from criminal activity is introduced into the legal economic cycle in order to conceal how it has been obtained.

What is terrorism financing?

Money which need not necessarily originate from criminal acts is used to finance a criminal organisation in order to support its criminal activities.





Provisional accommodation lined up in the foyer of the Reception and Procedure Centre in Muttenz. Behind the walls are beds and cupboards.

These second-hand clothes and shoes have been donated. Asylum seekers can help themselves if needed.

***Migrant smuggling** Almi*, an asylum seeker, had no choice but to pay smugglers to get him to Switzerland. It cost him several thousand euros. To counter this type of crime, fedpol and the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) work together to uncover smugglers and their networks. A report from the Federal Asylum Centre in Muttenz, near Basel.*

The price of a new life in Switzerland

A few sunflowers, still in bloom, greet the rising sun. This October morning, a soft light floods the small central garden in the courtyard of the registration and processing centre in Muttenz, a few kilometres from Basel. This patch of green is a bright spot in the daily lives of the asylum seekers who live here. Some of them arrived the day before. They will have to wait for their fingerprints to be checked. A number of families have gathered in a waiting room, along with some single men. A young boy rushes over to the other children and they play together, doing a jigsaw and piling up wooden blocks. Silence and calm prevail; apprehension perhaps. These men, women and children have arrived in Switzerland, sometimes despite them-

selves, after a long and difficult journey. Now they fear what will happen to them.

“When they know that you want to leave, they’ll take everything.”

Up on the third floor of the building, the contrast is striking. Almi is not calm. He is seething. He needs to recount what they did to him. They? The smugglers, as he

tells it. “I had to pay several tens of thousands of euros for my wife, my children and myself. I had to sell my house. If you have to flee, and they know it, they’ll take everything. And of course, because you want to get out, you give it to them”, he rages. The lady from the SEM attempts to calm him down and go through the interview questions again, one by one.

The SEM staff usually follow a series of questions to determine an asylum seeker’s situation. Today’s hearing is unusual, in that a dozen new questions are being asked. Their aim is to uncover migrant smuggling by criminal networks. “Where were you setting out for at the start of your journey?”, the SEM officer asks again. “Switzerland. I told the smuggler, and I gave him all the



money I had to get here”, Almi answers, still upset. “What agreement did you have with the smuggler?”, she continues. “If you look at the route I took to get here, you can see that, because of him, I was travelling for more than a year”, he adds, before explaining that he has valuable information about the smuggler. “How did he behave towards you?”, she asks. “Once he’d taken the money, we never saw him again”, he responds.

Valuable information for Europol

The interview ends a few hours later. In his disjointed story, Almi explains that he left his own country to go to Istanbul. There, he obtained flight tickets and documents for his family. An acquaintance put him in touch with a smuggler. Almi had to pay all the money he had. The price of a new life in Switzerland was more than 25,000 euros. He had to make the payment through a relative, who then paid the amount into an account belonging to an acquaintance of the smuggler. Having completed the first stage of the journey and arrived in Serbia, the family were forced to split up. Almi had to remain for several months, while his wife and children were permitted to leave. He needed another smuggler. Through other migrants who knew someone from outside the country, he paid almost 3,000 euros to be taken to Switzerland.

In his anger towards the smugglers, he is only too willing to pass on the information that he has. On that day, around four

hearings result in leads to these criminals. It is all thanks to Operation Dragon (see box).

Not everyone was as willing to talk as Almi. Sarah* comes out of the interview with her young daughter in her arms. She has fallen asleep as they were talking. They made the journey from Turkey, where they were given tickets and travel documents. Sarah was aiming to get to Cologne. How did she get to Switzerland? How did the smugglers treat her? The questions remained unanswered. Finally, she reveals that her uncle paid for her trip, and that she had contact with four smugglers, who had frightened her. But then she won't say any more, and goes back downstairs, where there is lively activity in a number of the rooms. In one, children are playing. A doll's house is proving particularly captivating for the young girls. In another, someone is giving a German course. Young adults copy out what has been written on the board, as they smile at each other. The smiles represent a brief interlude – a moment of lightness in their lives.

The asylum seekers' daily routines bring life to the centre. Aline* is there to support them. Formerly a team leader at Securitas, she now works for the SEM and knows the centre like the back of her hand. She is also familiar with how difficult it is for the men, women and children to live like this, without necessarily knowing what their future will be. A key figure at the centre, she explains the 'Swiss' rules of living side-



A recreation room with football tables, TV and sofa, where asylum seekers can meet.

Europol's Operation Dragon

Europol planned a series of law enforcement actions from 9 to 13 October 2017 as part of Operation Dragon. A number of joint, co-ordinated operations were carried out in 19 European countries, including Switzerland, to combat criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking by fostering international information-sharing.

In view of the migrant crisis in the European Union, migrant smuggling and

human trafficking are flourishing businesses on the routes from North Africa and the Middle East towards Europe. Criminals are proactive in recruiting future smuggling 'clients', identifying easy prey in places where there are a large number of vulnerable individuals such as women and children.

Another of the operation's objectives was to train staff in these places to recognise suspicious situations. In association with the SEM, and with the

support of the Swiss Border Guard and cantonal police forces, fedpol is contributing to this objective.

A list of specific questions was sent to the SEM staff to guide the initial hearings. The questions related to the presence of the smugglers during the journey. A total of 25 asylum seekers completed the questionnaire. In four of the cases fedpol and the SEM found indications of migrant smuggling.



by-side that everyone must follow. With a mix of different cultures, living together isn't always easy. The Muttenz centre can accommodate up to 500 – so many of whom might have been, or might potentially still become, victims of smuggler networks.

Learning how to identify smugglers

Switzerland is both a transit and destination country for migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Located at the heart of Europe and dealing with the current migrant situation, it is also affected by this type of crime. Co-operation with other European countries is vital. Without it, Switzerland would be a weak link.

To raise awareness among all of those who may come across migrant smuggling and human trafficking (security officers, SEM staff, cantonal police officers, criminal prosecution authorities, lawyers and employees of logistics companies) fedpol and the SEM have joined forces to run a pilot collaboration project. For example, the SEM staff and security officers are receiving training so that they can identify suspicious situations more easily. The project is also aimed at asylum seekers who have been the victims of smugglers. To encourage them to speak up, they are shown a film about the problem before their first interview. This joint project encourages the exchange of

information between the SEM and fedpol to gain a better understanding of how these criminal networks operate. Findings are then shared with Europol or INTERPOL.

Thomas*, head of the Securitas agents at the centre in Muttenz, briefs his staff on suspicious situations. "We keep a close eye on what goes on in the car park. Sometimes, families arrive at the centre accompanied by someone who claims to have met them by chance, wandering around lost near the station. That might be a suspicious situation, or it might just be a passer-by who took them straight to the centre", he explains. A simple identity check is enough to find out whether or not the person is telling the truth.

Not being a police officer, Valentine*, who works for the SEM co-ordinating initial hearings, sometimes finds it difficult to insist that certain questions are answered. "It isn't our job to investigate the smugglers. That said, sometimes with a single question we can put our finger on a problem that has been ignored up to that point", she adds.

Sometimes it is also difficult to tell whether the asylum seeker is telling a true story, or merely saying what the smugglers have advised them to tell the authorities. In Almi's case, he is very much telling the truth. The detailed information he provided during the interview was first verified by fedpol, then transmitted to Europol. The investigation is still ongoing.

*Names have been changed

***Human trafficking** Recognising signs of human trafficking can save lives. That is why the role of healthcare providers and medical staff is crucial. Part of fedpol's work involves raising awareness in this field and proposing possible courses of action. Professor Aristomenis Exadaktylos, senior consultant and director of the A&E department at the University Hospital of Bern, talks about the hospital's daily encounters with victims, and how medical staff can respond.*

Subtle signs of distress



Professor Aristomenis Exadaktylos heads the A&E department of the University Hospital of Bern.

fedpol: Professor Exadaktylos, how does one identify a victim of human trafficking?

Aristomenis Exadaktylos: It is very difficult. Women who are forced into prostitution, for example, do not necessarily come to A&E with a split lip or a black eye. They are seldom hit deliberately in the face, because that would not be good for business. Signs of distress are often much more subtle.

They may come to have a urinary infection treated or because they are suffering from alcohol poisoning. Only during a detailed examination do we then discover bruising to the stomach or back. These injuries can imply that the patient is being abused or exploited in some way. This phenomenon can be observed not only in the sex trade, but also in the construction, hotel and catering industries. Victims are exploited and abused not just physically, but also psychologically. Recognising psychological abuse is even more difficult; there is no 'typical' case. Ultimately, it is a combination of indicators or circumstances that suggests a person may be the victim of human trafficking. For example, the person may be a vulnerable foreigner who has been driven to despair by poverty in their home country and who prefers to be ill-treated and exploited rather than desti-

tute. Most exploiters approve of medical treatment so that they can continue exploiting their victims. They usually seek treatment at large hospitals or at anonymous walk-in medical centres, where there is less risk of attracting attention or having to answer inconvenient questions.

What can medical staff do?

Recognising subtle signs of abuse requires much experience and moral courage. Not all healthcare providers are up to dealing with such situations, but they do try to read between the lines. For example, they may have an uneasy feeling about, or notice inconsistencies in, the overall circumstances of a patient. Or the patient – usually a woman – is accompanied by her 'boyfriend', whose passive aggression draws attention. If a patient cannot speak German we use the telephone interpretation service. We ask a lot of questions and

Campaign to raise awareness among medical staff

How can medical staff identify a victim of human trafficking? What measures can they take? The fedpol campaign aims to raise awareness for the problem among healthcare providers and show them possible

courses of action. The campaign includes an information leaflet, a multilingual pocket card with the addresses of victim assistance centres, and a short film. Healthcare providers can find further information on the fedpol website. www.fedpol.admin.ch



Will she trust the doctor? A short film aims at raising the awareness of medical and healthcare staff in situations such as these.

try to find out as much as possible. But if a victim doesn't want to be helped we cannot keep them in hospital against their will. Sadly, that's a missed opportunity. If the person slips through the healthcare net, they often don't get a second chance.

This is where the fedpol awareness campaign comes into play.

The campaign aims to raise awareness. Medical staff should be able to read subtle signs from human trafficking victims, and provide them with long-term support. A short film is designed to show that there are possibilities for providing support, even if a person appears at first to not want help. For medical staff that means playing for time and gaining the patient's trust, before handing over a pocket card

with the addresses of advisory centres where victims can seek help if they later choose to. Medical staff thus give victims a perspective, by indicating to them that they can take control of their situation. This approach makes clear that healthcare providers understand the victims may not be able to act in their present situation, but that they have an option in future. And healthcare providers feel more confident if they know how to respond.

Human trafficking victims in A&E – a new phenomenon?

Although not a mass phenomenon to date, the numbers are rising. The A&E department of the University Hospital of Bern treats between 20 and 30 human trafficking victims every year. In Geneva

or Zurich these figures are probably much higher; the estimated number of unknown cases remains high. The problem is all too often ignored, but it exists, and like a rare disease it needs to be addressed. Victims deserve it. Even if we only manage to free a single person from the spiral of violence, then we have succeeded.






You have probably seen watermarks, security threads and ultra-violet fibres on Swiss banknotes. These same features ensure that forgers are doomed to failure when attempting to forge the Swiss passport. And, ultimately, the microchip cannot be altered without going unnoticed. So you see, your data are very difficult to forge and are securely protected against misuse.

Copying the Swiss passport is nearly impossible, thanks to its special, visible and invisible security features such as the security thread, not forgetting its tactile elements, Kinegram, and perforation. In other words, the Swiss passport is lasered, layered and pierced. Any attempt at imitation is therefore extremely difficult.

Your passport is a mirror of your identity, and protecting that identity is our primary objective. That is why fedpol is always one step ahead of the forgers. It is an art to find the right combination of security features that are easy and quick to identify, but nevertheless difficult to copy. The Swiss passport is a witness to this art.



Who sees what is regulated by a bilateral agreement between Switzerland and other countries. Your fingerprints may only be accessed by countries that share the same data protection standards as Switzerland and that comply with the appropriate EU norms. That means EU countries only. And to ensure that your data remain your data only, these countries are not permitted by law to store any information. Are you really the person in the passport? In case of doubt, a double check will help. The biometric data stored on the microchip provide unequivocal proof of your identity. Thanks to fingerprints and the coloured photo.

And should you lose your passport or have it stolen, don't worry, it can't go far. Advanced technology is on hand here, too. Simply report it to the police, who will register its loss in the RIPOLE database and with INTERPOL. Identity theft doesn't stand a chance.

Swiss-made

Switzerland is not only on the cover of the passport, it is also an integral part of the document. The Swiss passport is a Swiss product. Its colour, paper and other elements come from Swiss suppliers. And the document is assembled in the city of Bern. All components are tested before being put together. Wherever you go, your passport can withstand high levels of humidity or direct sunlight without becoming damaged. Quality, value and guaranteed supply – three advantages, made in Switzerland.

Under construction

Every year the Swiss authorities issue around 500,000 Swiss passports. To enable you to cross freely over the borders of more than 150 countries, fedpol keeps up to date with ongoing developments. In the next few years, the Swiss passport will undergo a new design and incorporate new security features. A small preview: for the first time ever, the Swiss abroad will get their own page in the passport, in addition to the cantons. The message: Broadening our vision, because Switzerland is no island.

State visit from China At the beginning of the year, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, paid a four-day visit to Switzerland. The visit was accompanied by a large Chinese delegation. Security services were on high alert. Responsible for Switzerland's largest ever security operation for a state visit: fedpol.

Maximum security for Xi Jinping

On touchdown of the Air China plane at Zurich-Kloten airport at midday, one day in January, the highly-complex security operation begins. It has been meticulously planned and negotiated over a period of several weeks, with numerous players, in meetings lasting many hours often continuing well into the night, and down to the last minute.

Maximum security is in place for Xi Jinping's visit. Following his official state visit to Bern, the Chinese president attends the World Economic Forum in Davos, and then travels to Lausanne to visit the International Olympic Committee, before proceeding to Geneva to pay a visit to the United Nations Organization and the World Health Organization. The itinerary poses a huge challenge for the security services.

fedpol co-ordinates

At the centre of all these security arrangements is fedpol. Time is short, the mandate many-sided, and the time of year

unfavourable. And the cantons have already committed a large contingent of police officers to the World Economic Forum. The mandate is co-ordinated by fedpol, who identifies interface functions with the cantonal police services, consults with the Chinese ambassadors in Bern and Geneva, and with the military attaché, and compiles a comprehensive overall schedule. Hundreds of people are involved in the operation.

But how does one go about accompanying a Chinese president, his wife, 20 ministers and a 500-head delegation safely through a Swiss winter? A specially chartered Swiss Federal Railways' train, with armoured compartments and accompanied by a large contingent of security officers, not just on board, but also on the roads and in the air, brings the guests via a secret route firstly to Bern. Part of the Chinese delegation travels in a separate motorcade, also accompanied by a police escort. Is the rail terminus adequately protected? Does protocol prescribe a separate programme for the

first lady? Are both parties in possession of the personal data of everyone involved? All measures require the utmost diligence.

The centre of Bern is cordoned off. The square in front of the Federal Palace is surrounded with barricades. Strategic posts are set up at close intervals. There are police on the surrounding rooftops and helicopters in the air. The cantonal police of Bern is involved in a large-scale operation. In the Federal Palace, the entire Federal Council is lined up in front of the cameras to welcome the Chinese head of state. In the Bellevue Hotel next door – booked exclusively for the Chinese visit – the ensuing state banquet takes place. Every person, every object and every room has been screened thoroughly beforehand.

Plan B at the ready

The following day, the delegation travels to Davos. In Chur, it changes trains and boards a composition of the Rhaetian Railway. At the same time, an emergency

motorcade of empty vehicles is en route by road. Just in case. Plan B has been defined down to the last detail; every person is prepared for any eventuality. It is freezing cold. At the last minute several train tracks have to be de-iced. But then everything goes according to plan. The Chinese president and Doris Leuthard, President of the Confederation, open the 47th World Economic Forum on schedule.

After his visit to Davos, Xi Jinping proceeds to the French-speaking part of Switzerland. First to Lausanne, then on to Geneva. The Calvinist city resembles a fortress. Every movement by road has been precisely planned. Every driver, every vehicle, every honorary company member has been checked in advance. The cantonal police are in action.

Know-how, flexibility, diplomacy

In the evening, when the Chinese guests have retired to their hotel rooms, a debrief-

ing takes place. Procedures for the following day are discussed. It's an ongoing schedule that requires continual adjustment. The situation is constantly monitored by fedpol and, if necessary, re-assessed. The focus is on security, not politics. Nevertheless, fedpol's security officers are expected not to strain the Swiss-Chinese friendship unnecessarily. To that end they must overcome cultural differences and linguistic challenges. Know-how, experience, co-ordination skills, diplomacy, flexibility, negotiation skills and assertiveness are further attributes vital to the success of the operation.

Four days later. The Air China plane is ready for take-off at Geneva-Cointrin airport. Xi Jinping thanks the head of fedpol's Security Co-ordination Section with a firm handshake. The president and his entourage have been safely escorted through Switzerland without a single incident. Mission accomplished.


Between politics and security

Xi Jinping's state visit to Switzerland also caused controversy. Human rights' campaigners condemn, in particular, China's policy on Tibet. The diplomatic incident 18 years ago, when demonstrating Tibetan sympathisers infuriated President Jian Zemin and embarrassed the Federal Council, has not been forgotten. This time, Tibetan demonstrators were obliged to keep a safe distance away from the Federal Palace, a measure that was widely criticised. There was also disapproval at the high cost of the state visit. Time and again fedpol, who is responsible for the security of people protected under international law such as heads of state during official, unofficial and private visits to Switzerland, finds itself in the midst of this debate. It is a fine balancing act between political and security interests.





**fights serious crime
and investigates cases
involving serious crime
in federal criminal
proceedings**



**ensures the safety
of people and
buildings under
federal protection**



fedpol at the centre of policing in Switzerland

In Switzerland, law and order are primarily the responsibility of the cantons. In our globalised world, however, crime does not stop at borders. Indeed, crime today is becoming ever more complex, often affecting several cantons simultaneously and frequently having an international dimension.

Against this backdrop, fedpol, as Switzerland's national police agency, plays a central role. It co-ordinates, analyses and investigates complex cases involving serious crime. And it provides vital infrastructures. Hence, fedpol is at the heart of policing in Switzerland and is the nexus to the country's international partners.





Our values:

1
EXEMPLARY –
WE LEAD BY EXAMPLE.

3
TOGETHER –
DIVERSITY IS OUR STRENGTH.

2
COMMITTED –
PASSION IS THE TRADEMARK
OF OUR WORK.

4
RELIABLE –
YOU CAN DEPEND ON US.

5
DYNAMIC –
WE FIND ANSWERS.

6
RESPONSIBLE –
WE MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS AT
THE RIGHT LEVEL.

Figures 2017:


Budget

245

million francs

Employees

928



Female: 337 (36.3 %)

Male: 591 (63.7 %)



Language distribution:

German 71.7

French 19.6

Italian 8.4

Romansh 0.3

Concept

Federal Office of Police fedpol

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Federal Office of Police fedpol

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Other information

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The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and transfers between accounts.

Next, the document outlines the process of reconciling bank statements with the company's records. This involves comparing the bank's record of transactions with the company's ledger to identify any discrepancies. Common reasons for differences include timing issues, such as deposits in transit or outstanding checks, as well as potential errors in recording or bank fees.

The document then addresses the preparation of the income statement. It explains how the data from the ledger is used to calculate the company's net income for a specific period. Key components include total revenue, cost of goods sold, and operating expenses. The final result is the net profit, which is a crucial indicator of the company's financial health.

Finally, the document discusses the importance of reviewing and auditing the financial records. Regular audits help to detect and correct errors, prevent fraud, and ensure that the financial statements are accurate and reliable. This process is essential for maintaining the trust of investors, creditors, and other stakeholders.

